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CONSENT SEARCHES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REASONABLENESS 
Alafair S. Burke* 
Abstract 
This Article builds on a growing body of scholarship discussing the 
role of reasonableness in consent-search doctrine. Although the language 
of “voluntary consent” implies a subjective inquiry into the state of mind 
of the person granting consent, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
injected an objective standard of reasonableness into its analysis of a 
citizen’s consent. Several scholars have characterized the Court’s consent 
jurisprudence as focusing not on true voluntariness but on the 
reasonableness of police conduct, which they argue is appropriate 
because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.” 
While the renewed scholarly focus on the role of reasonableness in the 
Court’s consent jurisprudence is helpful in explaining the puzzling 
disconnect between language and doctrine, much of this current emphasis 
has been distorted by the dichotomy between coercion and voluntariness: 
Did police use (unreasonable) coercive tactics that would override a 
(reasonable) person’s free will? However, the Fourth Amendment’s 
default concept of reasonableness is based not on coercion or volition but 
on its requirement of a warrant based on probable cause. Typically when 
the Court recognizes an exception to the default rule, it grounds that 
exception in a concept of reasonableness that requires a weighing of the 
governmental interests served by the warrantless conduct against the 
level of the intrusion on affected Fourth Amendment interests: liberty and 
privacy. Because the Court has relied on the myth of voluntary consent as 
a proxy for the warrant and probable cause requirements that normally 
define “reasonableness” in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has 
bypassed the usual substitute proxy for Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness: an express weighing of the governmental and citizen 
interests at stake. 
This Article engages in the reasonableness inquiry that the Supreme 
Court has avoided. Drawing on the Court’s approach to reasonableness in 
other Fourth Amendment contexts, this Article first looks to the concept 
of “macro reasonableness” to argue that the Court has overestimated the 
value of consensual searches to law enforcement and underestimated 
their effect on privacy. While the Court has emphasized the value of 
consensual searches yielding incriminatory evidence that might go 
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undetected absent the consent-search doctrine, many consent searches 
serve no government interests at all. Meanwhile the pervasiveness of the 
practice imposes tremendous costs to privacy. This Article then seeks to 
reshape the consent-search exception, using a requirement of “micro 
reasonableness,” to make the doctrine of consent more reflective of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Under this requirement, courts 
would examine not only the voluntariness of the consent underlying the 
search, but also the government’s reasons for requesting the consent and 
the scope of the consent requested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who has ever spent a day in a criminal courtroom, walked the 
sidewalks of an actively policed neighborhood, or watched an episode of 
any police show on television is familiar with this scene: A police officer 
initiates a conversation (“How you doing tonight?”), brings the topic 
around to criminal activity (“We’re hearing complaints from the 
neighborhood about drug activity”), and asks for consent to search (“Okay if I 
check that bag, just to make sure you’re not holding?”).  
It is difficult to assess the precise number of consent searches conducted 
because so many of them go undocumented, especially when they yield 
nothing incriminatory. 1  Despite numeric uncertainties, it is clear that 
consensual searches permeate real-world policing.2 Multiple scholars have 
estimated that consent searches comprise more than 90% of all warrantless 
searches by police,3 and that they are “unquestionably” the largest source of 
searches conducted without suspicion.4  And though the premise of the 
consent-search doctrine is that people are free to decline, the reality is that 
nearly everyone “consents,”5 at least as the Court has defined that term. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 214 & n.7 
(2001) (“There is no national clearinghouse for statistics on the number of times police ask for 
consent to search. And obviously, the published cases that raise the issue of consent are only the 
tip of the iceberg. For every consent search that ends up in the books, there are likely hundreds 
that are never disputed, either because nothing was found or because the defendant plea bargained 
and thus no evidentiary issues were litigated, or even, in rare circumstances, because the person 
refused consent to search!”). 
 2. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 317–18 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that the pervasive use of consent 
searches by the police “suggests that consent issues are of profound importance in the ‘real world’ 
of searches and seizures”); 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 16.01 (4th ed. 2006) (providing that consent searches “are a dominant—perhaps 
the dominant—type of lawful warrantless search” and anecdotally noting consent-search police 
practices performed by police officers); Brian R. Gallini, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: History’s 
Unspoken Fourth Amendment Anomaly, 79 TENN. L. REV. 233, 233 (2012) (describing consent 
searches as “one of the more popular” methods that officers “walking the beat” may use for 
conducting warrantless searches). A search for the term “knock and talk”—law enforcement slang 
for approaching a house without a warrant, knocking on the door, and asking to search for 
drugs—in Lexis’s “Federal and State Cases, Combined” library returned 1586 court decisions. 
LEXISNEXIS, http://www.advance.lexis.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (search for “knock and 
talk,” follow the “filters” dropdown menu, select “Jurisdiction,” then select the “All U.S. Federal” 
and “All States & Territories” filters). 
 3. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 317–18 (citing RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., 
THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICES 21 (1984)); Ric 
Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the 
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (“Over 90% of warrantless police 
searches are accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 4. Gerard E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 235 
(2007) (“Next to the pervasive automobile exception to the warrant requirement, consent is 
probably the leading justification offered for warrantless searches, and consent is unquestionably 
the leading rationale for searches undertaken without particularized probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion.”); see Gallini, supra note 2, at 233. 
 5. See Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1609, 1662 (2012) (gathering statistics and noting that “people consent so often that it 
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The law governing consensual searches suffers from multiple layers 
of schizophrenia. On one hand, the Supreme Court treats consent 
searches as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement; on the other, it views consensual encounters as completely 
beyond the Fourth Amendment’s reach. 6  On one hand, the Court’s 
assumption that at least some people may want to assist law enforcement 
by granting consent appears sound; on the other, one wonders why 
anyone would possibly consent to a search that will implicate him.7 And 
perhaps most perplexing of all is the discord between the doctrine and its 
application. On one hand, the general principle underlying the doctrine 
appears unassailable: Why should courts invalidate police action if the 
affected citizen was a voluntary participant? On the other hand, the Court 
has been continually willing to see voluntary consent where seemingly no 
one else would.8 
                                                                                                                     
undermines both the meaningfulness of the consent and the believability that the police are really 
respecting the doctrine”); ALEXANDER WEISS & DENNIS P. ROSENBAUM, UNIV. OF ILL. CHI., 
ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS STATISTICS ACT 2010 ANNOTATED REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2011), 
available at http://www.idot.illinois.gov/Assets/uploads/files/Transportation-System/Reports/Safety/Tr 
affic-Stop-Studies/2010/2010%20Illinois%20Traffic%20Stop%20Summary.pdf (reporting that 82% of 
drivers consented to a vehicle search when asked); Illya Lichtenberg, Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of 
Robinette on the “Voluntary” Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 HOW. L.J. 349, 367 (2001) 
(finding that more than 88% of drivers gave consent to search when asked before implementation 
of a Robinette warning and approximately 92.2% gave consent after the warning); Arrest, 
Discipline, Use of Force, Field Data Capture and Audit Statistics Reports and the City Status 
Report Covering the Period of January 1, 2006–June 30, 2006, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/special_assistant_for_constitutional_policing/content_basic_view/90
16 (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (containing reports of the numbers of drivers and passengers who 
consented to searches). In one six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2006, only three of 
16,228 drivers did not grant consent when asked, and 99% of pedestrians consented. Id. 
 6. See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 16.02, at 247–49 (discussing the 
seemingly incongruent rationales undergirding consent-search doctrine).    
 7. See John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2007) (“How 
much of an idiot—how stupid, moronic, imbecilic—would a person carrying a gram of crack 
cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent—‘freely and 
voluntarily’—to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would 
result inevitably in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?”); Kent Greenfield, Free 
Will Paradigms, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 11 (2011) (“If Fourth 
Amendment ‘consent’ means anything close to what ‘consent’ means in other contexts, then 
perhaps the mere fact that the passengers knew a search would reveal drugs and result in their 
arrest is strong evidence that the search was a result of intimidation and pressure rather than 
choice.”); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 
27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 128 (1998) (“It is inherently improbable that criminal suspects voluntarily 
would consent to the discovery of the very evidence necessary to seal their legal demise.”); 
Strauss, supra note 1, at 211 (describing her students’ “mass incredulity” that people in 
possession of contraband consent to searches). 
 8. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1662 (claiming that “most” people 
believe the Supreme Court’s conception of voluntary consent is “wrong”); Simmons, supra note 
3, at 774 (describing one of the Supreme Court’s findings of voluntary consent as “absurd”); 
Strauss, supra note 1, at 211; Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at 
Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 75 (2007). 
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The doctrine of Fourth Amendment consent is so schizophrenic that 
scholars can hardly use the term “voluntary consent” without qualifying 
it. They refer to the “fictions” of consent 9  and voluntariness, 10  dub 
consent searches “consent(less),” 11  and insist on placing the words 
voluntary and consent in quotation marks.12 Because of the disconnect 
many perceive between the standard of “voluntary consent,” and the 
Court’s application of it, many scholars have called for a more robust 
definition of “voluntariness.” For example, numerous scholars have 
called for a requirement that police notify suspects of their right to decline 
a request to search13 and for recognition that coercion is inherent in any 
police interaction.14 
In addition to the scholars seeking to change the doctrine of consent to 
require true consent, a growing body of scholarship instead attempts to 
explain the dichotomy between the language of consent and the actual 
doctrine of consent by exploring the distinction between subjective and 
objective notions of consent. The language of “voluntary consent” 
implies a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the person granting 
consent. 15  Although some of the Court’s early decisions on consent 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (“[T]he fiction of consent in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has led to suspicionless searches of many thousands of innocent citizens who 
‘consent’ to searches under coercive circumstances.”); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, 
Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 141 (“The Drayton world 
is fiction.”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 252 (“[T]he determination of voluntariness is currently 
confused, misapplied, and based on a fiction.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 786 (noting that critics of the consent-search 
doctrine have relied on empirical psychological studies to demonstrate “the harmful fiction of 
‘voluntariness’”).  
 11. See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 175, 175, 193 (1991) (“Both law and psychology point to the same conclusion—consent 
in reality is consentless.” (emphasis added)).  
 12. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1662 (noting that “yes, the continued 
use of scare quotes [for the word “consent”] is entirely deliberate”); Simmons, supra note 3, at 
783–85 (repeatedly placing the word voluntary in quotation marks); Lichtenberg, supra note 5 
(placing the word “voluntary” in quotation marks in the article’s title). 
 13. See, e.g., Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the 
Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399, 465–66 (2004) 
(recommending warnings, similar to the warnings rejected in Schneckloth, that would require 
police to warn people they have a right to refuse consent); Gallini, supra note 2, at 235–36; Craig 
Hemmens & Jeffrey R. Maahs, Reason to Believe: When Does Detention End and a Consensual 
Encounter Begin? An Analysis of Ohio v. Robinette, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 309, 346 (1996) 
(arguing that officers should be required to advise citizens of their right to not cooperate); Christo 
Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171, 1177 (2007) 
(encouraging states to use their own constitutions to implement several consent-search reforms, 
including warnings about the right to refuse consent); cf. Robert H. Whorf, “Coercive Ambiguity” 
in the Routine Traffic Stop Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 410 (1997) 
(suggesting a rule requiring police officers to return “a motorist’s driving documents before or 
simultaneous with the statement ‘you are free to go’”). 
 14. See infra Section II.B. 
 15. See Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 177 (“In the context of the consent search, the 
subjective view seems required because the sole validating source of police authority to intrude on 
5
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searches do indicate the use of a subjective standard, the Court has 
repeatedly injected an objective standard of reasonableness into its 
analysis of consent.16 The Court’s focus in determining voluntariness is 
not on whether the defendant actually exercised free will in granting 
consent, but instead on whether police used unacceptable tactics to gain 
consent. 17  Scholars have analyzed the Court’s consent jurisprudence 
through a “new paradigm” of reasonableness, characterizing the case law 
as focusing not on true voluntariness, but on the reasonableness of police 
conduct.18 This emphasis on reasonableness is said to be appropriate 
because, after all, “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”19  
Though the renewed scholarly focus on the role of reasonableness in 
the Court’s consent jurisprudence is helpful in explaining the puzzling 
disconnect between language and doctrine, much of the current emphasis 
on reasonableness is still articulated through the coercion/voluntariness 
dichotomy: Did police use (unreasonably) coercive tactics that would 
override a (reasonable) person’s free will? This focus on the coerciveness 
of the police conduct, and its subsequent impact upon volition, is not the 
same standard of reasonableness that is the touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment. Instead, it is borrowed from the Court’s Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence governing the voluntariness of statements to police.20  
That the Court has built confession law around a compulsion/consent 
dichotomy is unsurprising given the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that 
no person be “compelled” to be a witness against himself.21 But the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition is against “unreasonable” searches and 
seizures, and the default measure of reasonableness is a warrant based on 
probable cause.22 Usually when the Court recognizes an exception to the 
default rule, it grounds that exception in a concept of reasonableness that 
requires a weighing of the governmental interests served by the 
                                                                                                                     
a premier constitutional right is the individual’s grant of permission.”).   
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. Strauss, supra note 1, at 212.   
 18. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 773, 822 (“The new paradigm is simple: instead of 
holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply because the individual has ‘voluntarily’ 
waived his rights, we are applying the Fourth Amendment to the search and concluding that as 
long as the police officer’s behavior is appropriate, the search is reasonable and thus 
constitutional.” (emphasis added)). 
 19. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967)). 
 20. See infra notes 176–80 and accompanying text. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 22. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“The text of the Amendment thus 
expressly imposes two requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be reasonable. Second, 
a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the 
authorized search is set out with particularity.”); Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1037 
(2013) (“This Court has stated the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are reasonable 
only if based on probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
6
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warrantless conduct against the level of the intrusion to the affected 
Fourth Amendment interests: liberty and privacy.23 Because the Court 
has instead relied on the myth of voluntary consent as a proxy for the 
warrant and probable cause requirements that normally define 
“reasonable” in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has also 
bypassed the usual substitute proxy for Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness: an express weighing of the governmental and citizen 
interests at stake. By focusing on reasonableness through the Fifth 
Amendment lens of preventing coercion, rather than reasonableness 
through the Fourth Amendment lens of protecting liberty and privacy, the 
Court has lost sight of the heart of the Fourth Amendment itself. 
This Article builds upon the renewed scholarly focus on the role 
reasonableness plays in the Court’s consent jurisprudence by looking to 
the traditional balancing of Fourth Amendment interests to shape 
consent-search doctrine. Drawing on the Court’s approach to 
“reasonableness” in other Fourth Amendment contexts, this Article looks 
to the concept of “macro reasonableness” to argue that, as currently 
defined, the consent-search doctrine strikes an improper balance between 
governmental and individual interests at stake. It then seeks to reshape the 
prevailing doctrine, using a requirement of “micro reasonableness,” to 
strike a better balance and to make the doctrine of consent more 
reasonable at a macro level. 
Part I sets forth the current doctrine governing consent searches and 
demonstrates that the Court has been quick to find consent whenever a 
person has an alternative to complying with a law enforcement request. 
Part II sets forth the most prevalent critique of the consent-search 
exception to the warrant requirement—its failure to reflect the real-world 
dynamics of police–citizen interactions. Turning to the role that 
reasonableness plays in consent-search doctrine, Part III examines the 
Court’s focus on objective factors, rather than a subjective standard of 
voluntariness, in scrutinizing the “voluntariness” of consent searches. 
This Article then argues that the Court has focused on reasonableness 
only at the micro level, and only in terms of coercion, examining on a 
case-by-case basis the coerciveness of police tactics.  
Part IV proposes an alternative standard of macro reasonableness for 
consensual searches that requires balancing the interests of law 
enforcement against the costs to individual liberty and privacy. This 
Article then demonstrates that, to the extent the Court has undertaken a 
“macro” examination of reasonableness at all, it has overstated the extent 
that consent searches advance governmental interests and understated 
their toll on individual privacy. Finally, Part V concludes with a 
                                                                                                                     
 23. See infra notes 218–27 and accompanying text; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
703 (1983) (“The exception to the probable-cause requirement for limited seizures of the person 
recognized in Terry and its progeny rests on a balancing of the competing interests to determine 
the reasonableness of the type of seizure involved within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s 
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
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proscriptive recommendation of how consent doctrine might be altered to 
make it more reflective of the Fourth Amendment’s “touchstone” of 
reasonableness. When scrutinizing whether a search falls within the 
consent-search exception to the warrant requirement, courts should look 
not only at the voluntariness of the person’s consent, but also at the 
reasonableness of the government’s request for consent. By employing a 
“micro” requirement of reasonableness that focuses on traditional Fourth 
Amendment factors rather than Fifth Amendment notions of coercion, 
the consent-search doctrine would comport with Fourth Amendment 
notions of reasonableness at a “macro” level. This approach would also 
drastically change the manner in which law enforcement is trained to 
conduct consent searches. Rather than treating them as “free” searches 
outside of the usual Fourth Amendment framework, law enforcement 
would need to be mindful of the reasonableness of consent searches at all 
stages, not only in obtaining consent, but also in the initial request and the 
subsequent execution.  
I.  THE DOCTRINE OF CONSENT 
The Fourth Amendment familiarly provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.24 
The Amendment’s “reasonableness clause” protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, while the Supreme Court has read 
the Amendment’s “warrant clause” to create a default presumption that, 
to be reasonable, searches and seizures must be conducted pursuant to a 
warrant based on probable cause.25  
Despite the Supreme Court’s formal reliance on the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant clause to define reasonableness, searches 
conducted with warrants are, empirically, the exception in criminal 
investigations.26 The divergence between the formal default presumption 
and the reality on the streets can be attributed primarily to two attributes 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court has defined the 
terms “search” and “seizure” in ways that remove many investigative 
tactics from the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Second, even if police 
activity rises to the level of a “search” or a “seizure,” as the Court has 
defined those terms, the Court has recognized numerous exceptions to the 
                                                                                                                     
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 25. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a 
policeman or government enforcement agent.”). 
 26. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 139–40 
(2008) (discussing the empirical gap between searches conducted with and without warrants). 
8
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warrant requirement, allowing law enforcement to rely on alternative 
measures of a search or seizure’s reasonableness. 
The distinction between these two doctrinal “moves” is critical. The 
use of the first move is determinative as a threshold matter. By its very 
language, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches 
and seizures.27 If police action constitutes neither a search nor a seizure, 
the Fourth Amendment provides no role for the judiciary to scrutinize its 
reasonableness, whether defined through the warrant clause or not.28 The 
non-search/non-seizure could be as unreasonable as imaginable (e.g., 
inspecting the curbside garbage29 of only those homes painted in primary 
colors), and yet the Fourth Amendment would have nothing to say about 
it.30 In contrast, when the Court uses the second “move,” the challenged 
police action is still subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Accordingly, 
even if the Court is persuaded to set aside the presumptive warrant 
requirement, the government conduct still must be reasonable.31 
As demonstrated in this Part, the Court has permitted consent searches 
not by removing them from the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
altogether, but by recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement. 
Accordingly, the resulting searches must be reasonable. Moreover, in 
applying the consent exception, the Court has been quick to find 
voluntary consent as long as the consenting party had the option of 
refusing.  
A.  Consent Searches Are “Searches” 
Under Katz v. United States,32 police activity constitutes a search only 
if it implicates reasonable expectations of privacy.33 This is a two-prong 
test, requiring first that the person manifest a subjective expectation of 
privacy, and second, that the expectation of privacy “be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”34 In applying the Katz standard, 
the Court has held that when people make otherwise private information 
available publicly, governmental inspection of that information does not 
implicate reasonable expectations of privacy and therefore does not 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979).   
 28. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) 
(“Numerous other courts have agreed that the use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area 
simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.”).   
 29. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit warrantless searches of garbage voluntarily 
left out for collection. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). For a general 
discussion of what constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, see Section I.A. 
 30. As one early commentator noted: “[W]here the [F]ourth [A]mendment is inapplicable, 
the law does not give a constitutional damn about noncompliance.” Charles E. Moylan, Jr., The 
Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold 
of “So What?,” 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76. 
 31. See Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558–59. 
 32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).   
 33. Id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 361.  
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constitute a search.35 For example, neither surveillance from a public 
vantage point36 nor inspection of a person’s garbage is considered a 
“search,”37 and therefore police may engage in these activities without 
even justifying them as reasonable. This is true even when the public 
vantage point is from a low-level helicopter hovering over otherwise 
protected curtilage38 or when flashlights,39  binoculars,40  or electronic 
beepers41 facilitate the viewing of publicly exposed information. 
One possible conception of a consent search is that it does not 
constitute a “search” at all because the person has voluntarily chosen to 
allow the police to search and therefore no longer expects privacy in the 
area searched.42 Indeed, this is the doctrinal approach the Court has used 
to validate the lawfulness of consensual encounters with police, 
removing them entirely from the definition of a “seizure.”43 The seeds for 
the idea that not all police–citizen encounters rise to the level of a Fourth 
Amendment “seizure” were first planted in United States v. 
Mendenhall.44 In Mendenhall, two plainclothes agents approached the 
defendant as she was walking through an airport concourse, identified 
themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her airline ticket and 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
48–56 (9th ed. 2010) (noting that cases after Katz make clear that “if an aspect of a person’s life is 
subject to scrutiny by other members of society, then that person has no legitimate expectation in 
denying equivalent access to police,” and providing several examples). 
 36. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)). 
 37. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988). 
 38. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451. 
 39. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1983) (“It is likewise beyond dispute that 
Maples’ action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior of Brown’s car trenched upon no 
right secured to the latter by the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 40. E.g., United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 41. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). To be sure, the use of technology that 
reveals more than has been exposed to public view can constitute a search. E.g., Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that police conducted a “search” by using heat-detection 
devices to monitor heat radiation from a home, in part, because it revealed details about activity in 
the home that would otherwise have been unknown without physical intrusion).  
 42. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. 
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates 
the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1991) (providing that consent 
searches are easily conceptualized as non-searches under Katz—thereby rendering the Fourth 
Amendment “inapplicable”—because “consent amounts to a citizen’s surrender of an expectation 
of privacy and an exposure of an otherwise private interest”). 
 43. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 434 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555, 558 (1980). 
 44. See 446 U.S. at 554–55 (providing that absent some indicia of seizure, such as the 
threatening presence of officers or the display of a weapon, “inoffensive contact between a 
member of the public and the police cannot, as a matter of law, amount to a seizure of that 
person”). A plurality of the Supreme Court first applied the free-to-leave test in Royer, but cited 
Justice Stewart’s analysis in Mendenhall as support. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 (citing Mendenhall, 
446 U.S. at 555). 
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identification.45 At the agent’s request, she eventually followed them to 
the airport Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office, where she 
ultimately consented to a search of both her person and purse.46 Justice 
Powell, concurring, reasoned that any seizure of the defendant was 
supported by the requisite level of suspicion.47 Justice Stewart, however, 
writing for himself and Justice Rehnquist, reasoned that the defendant 
was never seized at all; therefore, the government did not need to justify 
the encounter.48  
To remove some police–citizen encounters from judicial scrutiny, 
Justice Stewart compiled language from the Court’s seizure 
jurisprudence that appeared to distinguish between seizures that 
implicated Fourth Amendment interests and mere encounters that did 
not.49 In Terry v. Ohio,50 for example, the Court observed that “not all 
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ 
of persons.”51 Concurring in Terry, both Justice White and Justice Harlan 
noted that a police officer, like any other person, has the right to pose 
questions to people on the street. 52  In Mendenhall, Justice Stewart 
reasoned that a person has not been seized unless her freedom of 
movement has been restrained, either through physical force or a show of 
authority. 53  This conception of a voluntary citizen–police encounter 
conjures images of cordial police officers, walking the beat, talking to 
cooperative citizens about the neighborhood, the weather, and baseball: 
“As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to 
disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon 
that person’s liberty or privacy . . . .”54  
In Florida v. Royer,55 a plurality of the Court built upon Justice 
Stewart’s earlier conception of a consensual police encounter and held 
that an encounter rises to the level of a “seizure” only if, under the totality 
of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 547–48. 
 46. Id. at 548.  
 47. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring). The government needs “reasonable suspicion” to 
support a brief, investigatory seizure of a person that falls short of an arrest. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Where such a stop is reasonable, 
however, the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is . . . an 
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence.” (emphasis added)).  
 48. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court). 
 49. Id. at 552–55.   
 50. 392 U.S. 1.  
 51. Id. at 19 n.16. 
 52. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (“There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a 
policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.”); id. at 32–33 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (observing that police officers enjoy “the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to 
address questions to other persons”). 
 53. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).  
 54. Id. at 554. 
 55. 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality opinion).   
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would not have felt free to leave.56 As long as a reasonable person feels 
free to leave, the Court treats the police activity as a mere encounter, 
beneath the Fourth Amendment threshold. Importantly, by removing 
these encounters from the definition of a “seizure,” the Court has left no 
role for the judiciary under the Fourth Amendment to scrutinize the 
reasonableness of the encounter at all, let alone require a warrant. 
One could imagine the Court taking a similar approach to consent 
searches. Government conduct constitutes a search only if it implicates 
reasonable expectations of privacy, and one could argue that a person 
loses any reasonable expectation of privacy by agreeing to a search. 
Instead, the Court has used a different doctrinal basis for conceptualizing 
consent in the search context, treating consent searches as “searches” 
under the Fourth Amendment, but recognizing consent as an exception to 
the warrant and probable cause requirements. The seminal case reflecting 
this approach is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.57 In Schneckloth, an officer 
stopped a vehicle because a headlight and license plate light were burned 
out.58 The driver and four of his five passengers, including the defendant, 
could not produce a license. 59  The one passenger that produced 
identification, said the car was his brother’s, and gave consent to a search 
of the car—answering, “Sure, go ahead”—which yielded evidence 
incriminating the defendant.60 
The Court began with a general pronouncement that all searches 
conducted without a warrant based on probable cause were presumed to 
be unreasonable, but then noted “that one of the specifically established 
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a 
search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”61 In exploring the proper 
test for determining the voluntariness of consent, the Court expressly 
distinguished between the notion of voluntary consent necessary to 
validate a warrantless search and the notion of a knowing, voluntary, and 
intentional relinquishment of rights necessary to waive other rights 
associated with a fair trial, such as the right to a lawyer or to a jury under 
the Sixth Amendment.62 The Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, did 
not go directly to the reliability or integrity of the fact-finding mission of 
a trial.63 Moreover, the Court believed it would be unfeasible to expect 
police on the street to adhere to the same standards of waiver that can be 
met in the formal setting of a courtroom.64 Instead, the Court held that the 
voluntariness of consent must be determined in light of the totality of the 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 502 (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). 
 57. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 58. Id. at 220.   
 59. Id.   
 60. Id.   
 61. Id. at 219.  
 62. See id. at 242–43. 
 63. Id. at 242 (“The protections of the Fourth Amendment . . . have nothing whatever to do 
with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial.”).  
 64. Id. at 231–32, 243. 
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circumstances.65  Importantly, the citizen’s knowledge of his right to 
refuse to grant consent—imperative to any showing of a true 
“waiver”—was only one fact to be considered.66 Accordingly, a court 
could deem consent to be voluntary even when the police did not advise 
the citizen that he was free to decline.67 
The general role that the concept of consent plays in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine—whether by removing consensual encounters 
from the scope of the amendment altogether or by treating consensual 
searches as reasonable—appears at first glance to be eminently 
uncontroversial. If a person chooses to engage in an encounter with 
police, or to share with law enforcement information that would 
otherwise be private, why should courts interfere with that decision and 
prohibit the government’s activity after the fact? In both the search and 
seizure context, the Court has relied on the intuitive appeal of the 
common-sense notion that people are free to cooperate with law 
enforcement if they choose to do so. 68  Accordingly, if a person 
voluntarily opts not to exercise the full scope of her liberty or privacy 
rights under the Fourth Amendment, then the police are entitled to rely on 
the volunteered cooperation without judicial interference.69 
However, the Court’s application of this common-sense premise 
reveals two hidden, less innocuous assumptions about human choice: 
first, that a person’s agreement in the face of alternative options means 
that the person has voluntarily consented; and second, that people who 
consent in the absence of police compulsion do so because they want to 
cooperate with police. The next Section explores those hidden 
assumptions about human choice. 
B.  Consent in Action: Options and Preference 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the notion that a person’s consent to 
police conduct should be dispositive of the conduct’s legality, scholars 
are nearly universal in their criticism of the Court’s treatment of consent 
in both the liberty and privacy contexts. Multiple scholars have noted a 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 227.   
 66. Id. at 249.   
 67. See id. at 231–33; see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203, 206 (2002); 
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996). 
 68. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 197, 205 (“The Fourth Amendment permits police 
officers to approach bus passengers at random to ask questions and to request their consent to 
searches, provided a reasonable person would understand that he or she is free to refuse.” 
(emphasis added)); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (distinguishing unreasonable 
searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and “voluntary cooperation” 
permitted by the Fourth Amendment); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243 (providing that the Fourth 
Amendment is not designed to discourage the community from “aiding” in the apprehension of 
criminals because the community has a “real interest in encouraging consent”). 
 69. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207 (“Police officers act in full accord with the law when they 
ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her 
wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, 
it dispels inferences of coercion.”).  
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schism between the language of the governing standards, which 
emphasizes freedom of voluntary choice, and actual case outcomes, 
where the Court repeatedly finds voluntary consent when reality would 
suggest otherwise. 70  Though the premise of the free-to-leave and 
consent-search doctrines is that police, like any other people, are free to 
approach people on the street,71 encounters and consent searches that 
eventually yield incriminatory evidence tend to go beyond a discussion of 
weather, sports, or any other innocuous conversation that any two 
ordinary citizens might have on the street. Indeed, the seminal cases 
themselves involve facts that show the pressures attendant in 
police–citizen interactions, even in the absence of direct threats or 
commands. 
In Mendenhall, for example, after the agents initially approached the 
defendant in the airport and asked for her ticket and identification, the 
defendant produced a ticket and identification in two different names.72 
The agents then questioned the defendant about the discrepancy and 
about the length of her trip.73 One of the agents specifically identified 
himself as a federal drug agent.74 According to the government’s own 
testimony, the defendant’s demeanor changed notably in response to this 
information: she “became quite shaken” and “extremely nervous” and 
“had a hard time speaking.”75 When the agents returned her ticket and 
identification to her and asked her to accompany them to the airport DEA 
office for further questioning, she followed them, but with no verbal 
response noted in the record.76 Though she initially gave the agents 
permission to search her person and purse, it was not until a female police 
officer arrived that she learned for the first time that a search of her person 
would require her to remove her clothing. 77  The defendant did not 
immediately agree. Instead, she said she needed to catch her flight.78 In 
response, the officer said there would be no problem if the defendant 
were not carrying drugs.79 The defendant yielded, once again without 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 773–74 (arguing that the Court’s consent-search 
paradigm “fails to acknowledge the complexities of police-civilian interaction and runs against 
the traditional standards of the Fourth Amendment” and noting that Drayton is an example in 
which, like past Supreme Court decisions, “the ruling that the defendants truly consent[] to the 
search had . . . an ‘air of unreality’ about it”); see also supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.  
 71. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw 
enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual 
on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by 
putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal 
prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.” (citations omitted)).  
 72. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547–48 (1980). 
 73. Id. at 548. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 76. Id.   
 77. Id. at 548–49. 
 78. Id. at 549.   
 79. Id. 
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verbal comment, and disrobed for the search, revealing narcotics hidden 
beneath her clothes.80  
The defendant later argued that her statement to the police officer that 
she needed to catch her flight demonstrated resistance to the search.81 
Justice Stewart rejected this argument, reasoning that the statement 
simply evinced a concern about how long the search would take―as if 
anyone concerned with the timing of a flight would ever volunteer for a 
detour to and search within a DEA office.82 Despite the nature of the 
conversation (we are agents looking for drugs), the setting (come with us 
even though you are trying to catch a flight), the individuals involved 
(two agents and a police officer versus one demonstrably nervous, 
twenty-two-year-old high-school dropout), and the intrusiveness of the 
ultimate outcome (a strip search), Justices Stewart and Rehnquist would 
have held that no seizure occurred,83 and a majority of the Court upheld 
the search as consensual.84  
As Professor Kent Greenfield has noted, the Court has been quick to 
find valid consent based simply upon the existence of an alternative 
choice, without exploring the desirability or feasibility of that option.85 
For example, in INS v. Delgado,86 the Court reviewed the legality of 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) factory sweeps, in which 
INS agents inspected workplaces to determine if employers were using 
unauthorized workers.87 The agents were armed, wearing badges, and 
carrying walkie-talkies.88 Some of the agents stood at the factory exits 
while others moved through the workplace to question workers about 
their citizenship status.89 The Court recognized that workers might feel 
restricted in their movement under these conditions, but reasoned that the 
limitation came from the realities of being at work, not because the agents 
were keeping them there.90 Because the workers still had the option of 
moving about the factory freely, they had not been seized, and therefore 
the sweeps did not need to be justified as reasonable.91 
Perhaps most illustrative of the Court’s penchant for equating the 
existence of options to voluntary consent is its approval of so-called bus 
sweeps in Florida v. Bostick92 and United States v. Drayton.93 In both 
                                                                                                                     
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 559.   
 82. Id.   
 83. Id. at 555 (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).  
 84. Id. at 558 (majority opinion).  
 85. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12 (exploring what he calls an “ultra-dispositionalist 
paradigm” to defining choice, in which the existence of other choices is dispositive). 
 86. 466 U.S. 210 (1984). 
 87. Id. at 212.   
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.   
 90. Id. at 218. 
 91. Id. at 218–19.  
 92. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 93. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
15
Burke: Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
524 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
cases, armed agents participating in drug interdiction programs boarded 
buses during stopovers and asked passengers for consent to search their 
luggage for contraband.94 In Bostick, the Court held that there was no per 
se prohibition against the sweeps, even though no passenger would 
literally feel “free to leave” a bus on which they had booked a ride.95 
Likening the facts to Delgado, the Court in Bostick reasoned that the 
passengers’ movements were confined not by government conduct, but 
by the realities of their own conditions.96 The relevant inquiry, the Court 
held, was “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the 
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”97 Although the 
Court declined to answer this critical question in Bostick,98 it went further 
in Drayton, finding that a reasonable bus passenger would have felt free 
to disengage from a bus sweep, even though officers were posted at the 
bus entrance and passengers were not told they had a right not to 
participate in the requested searches. 99  To the majority, Drayton’s 
engagement with the officer was consensual, and therefore not a seizure, 
because he had options: he could have gotten off the bus or declined the 
search and remained seated among his fellow consenting passengers 
(after having been the one bad egg who refused to cooperate with law 
enforcement).100 
The Court’s consent jurisprudence exposes a worldview that assumes 
not only that reasonable people can exercise their options vis-à-vis law 
enforcement, but also that when they do, the option they exercise is 
preferred. From this view, a person who chooses to be searched when she 
could say no, or who chooses to stay when she could in fact go, is not only 
uncoerced, she is content because she wants to cooperate. For example, 
the defendant in Drayton pointed to the fact that nearly all passengers 
consented to a search in the bus sweeps as evidence that people believed 
that they had no choice but to comply.101 The majority rejected this 
reasoning and instead viewed the high levels of cooperation as evidence 
that people know their rights, are able to exercise them, and yet 
choose—not only without coercion, but happily and for their own 
benefit—to consent: The “bus passengers answer officers’ questions and 
otherwise cooperate not because of coercion but because the passengers 
know that their participation enhances their own safety and the safety of 
those around them.”102  
                                                                                                                     
 94. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431–32; Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194.  
 95. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435–36, 440.   
 96. Id. at 436. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 437 (refraining from “deciding whether or not a seizure occurred in this case”).   
 99. 536 U.S. at 197–98, 203–04. 
 100. See id. at 203–04.  
 101. See id. at 205. 
 102. Id. 
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Similarly, in Sibron v. New York,103 decided the same day as Terry v. 
Ohio,104 a police officer approached the defendant in a restaurant and told 
him to accompany the officer outside.105 Although the Court did not 
determine whether Sibron had been seized, it noted that the record was 
“barren of any indication whether Sibron accompanied [the officer] 
outside in submission to a show of force or authority which left him no 
choice, or whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation 
with the officer’s investigation.”106 The Court appears to treat coercion 
and content cooperation as the only possible explanations. As Professor 
Ric Simmons has cogently argued, the Court has created a fiction that 
treats coercion and voluntary consent as either/or conditions in a false 
binary: consent that is not coerced by improper state conduct is treated as 
if it is happily and freely given.107 The Court assumes that the reason 
people consent to police activity, when they have the option of declining, 
is out of desire to help the police serve the public.108 
II.  THE ABSENCE OF TRUE CONSENT 
Nearly unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the Court’s application 
of both the free-to-leave and consent doctrines, scholars have called on 
the judiciary to apply the tests with a realistic understanding of the 
reasons people comply with requests from law enforcement.109 These 
scholars reject the false binaries of either explicit police coercion, on one 
                                                                                                                     
 103. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 104. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 105. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 45.   
 106. Id. at 63. 
 107. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 785 (noting the falseness of the Court’s treatment of 
coercion and voluntariness as a binary, in which “a consent to search is ‘voluntary’ if the police 
have not used ‘coercive’ tactics in obtaining the consent”). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (stating that citizen 
consent to searches reinforces a society based on law); Andrew E. Taslitz, Bullshitting the People: 
The Criminal Procedure Implications of a Scatalogical Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383, 
1422–24 (2007) (setting forth studies and research supporting the proposition that people may 
obey the police, despite the option not to comply, because of a “moral obligation” to do the right 
thing and to “empower government to solve problems”). 
 109. See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 9, 155–57 (criticizing the Court’s consent-search analysis 
as understating the “extent to which citizens in police encounters feel free to refuse” and 
recommending that the consent-search paradigm should incorporate empirical findings “on 
compliance and social influence into Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence”); Rotenberg, 
supra note 11, at 185–86 (“If consent is determined from the police perspective, and the 
consenter’s subjective limits to the search, as artificial and fictional as they are, do not serve to 
restrain the police, then the consent search becomes virtually limitless.”); cf. Chanenson, supra 
note 13, at 459–61 (arguing that while the emerging empirical evidence “highlights disturbing 
concerns about the role of citizens’ fear of police reprisal in the consent search process,” courts 
are seemingly less apt than the police departments themselves to consider this empirical evidence 
in resolving legal issues surrounding consent searches); Tracy Maclin, The Good and Bad News 
About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 78–81 (2008) 
(suggesting that if a person refuses to give consent, then police should be barred from further 
seeking consent in order to “protect the Fourth Amendment rights of persons who are 
uncomfortable dealing with police-citizen encounters”).  
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hand, or “in a spirit of apparent cooperation,”110 and for “their own safety 
and the safety of those around them,”111 on the other. Most commonly, 
critics have pointed to two other explanations for so-called cooperation 
with law enforcement: lack of knowledge about options and lack of 
fortitude to exercise them.  
A.  Lack of Knowledge  
First, despite the Court’s assumption that a request necessarily 
conveys the listener’s power to decline, people may be unaware of their 
options not to cooperate with a police request.112 They may see the right 
to decline as one that comes with legal or practical costs. As a legal 
matter, they may believe that a failure to cooperate will be viewed as 
suspicious and lead not only to the inevitable search but perhaps even 
more coercive action by the police.113 These fears are not unfounded 
given the broad discretion police have to enforce the most minor 
transgressions through custodial arrest.114  
In Ohio v. Robinette,115 the Court appeared to reason that a driver 
would feel free to disengage from law enforcement, even when the initial 
limitation on his freedom of movement resulted from a police seizure.116 
The defendant was initially stopped for speeding.117 The officer asked for 
and received the defendant’s driver’s license, ran the defendant’s driving 
history, and then asked the defendant to step out of the car.118 After giving 
the defendant a verbal warning for speeding and returning his license to 
him, the officer said, “One question before you get gone: [A]re you 
carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, 
drugs, anything like that?”119 The defendant responded, “no,” and then 
                                                                                                                     
 110. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 63.  
 111. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 205. 
 112. See Chanenson, supra note 13, at 454 (discussing empirical research showing that most 
people do not know of their right to refuse to consent). 
 113. See H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL: A COLUMBIA LAW PROFESSOR’S YEAR ON 
THE STREETS WITH THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE 81 (1988) (“Refusal of requested ‘permission’ is 
thought by most of us to risk unpleasant, though unknown, consequences.”); Burkoff, supra note 
7, at 1118 (noting that people fear that a refusal to cooperate will make them look guilty); 
Chanenson, supra note 13, at 454. 
 114. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173–76 (2008) (holding that a custodial arrest for 
a misdemeanor is constitutionally valid even if the state legislature has determined that 
punishment for the crime does not include arrest); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 
323–24, 354–55 (2001) (holding that if a police officer “has probable cause to believe that an 
individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense,” such as a seatbelt offense, then the 
police officer “may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender” (emphasis 
added)); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996) (upholding police seizure of a 
driver who had committed a minor traffic offense and holding that the officer’s subjective 
intentions for the seizure were immaterial). 
 115. 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
 116. See id. at 38–40.  
 117. Id. at 35.   
 118. Id.   
 119. Id. at 35–36 (alteration in original). 
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consented to a search of his car, which yielded controlled substances.120 
The Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in favor of the 
defendant, because the state court had incorrectly used a bright-line rule 
requiring police to tell a previously seized suspect that he was free to 
leave prior to engaging in consensual interrogation. 121  Although the 
Court’s opinion was narrow, it reveals an underlying assumption that 
there exists any set of circumstances in which a driver already stopped by 
police on the side of the road would choose to leave before being told 
expressly that he has a right to do so. The Court did not even entertain the 
possibility that the defendant may have believed that he would have been 
detained longer if he refused to consent to the search. 
Even if people do not fear legal repercussions for refusing to consent, 
they may believe as a practical matter that the searches are a prerequisite 
to maintaining their status quo, and may not want to be treated differently 
as a result of their non-compliance with police. 122  For example, 
passengers on a bus may believe that bus-sweep searches 123  are a 
prerequisite to remaining on the bus and may not want to exit a bus in the 
middle of the night, in the middle of nowhere.124 Employees at a factory 
may view compliance with the INS125 as a precondition to employment 
and may not want to be disciplined or fired for failing to comply with a 
request for information. Members of communities with historically tense 
relationships with police may fear that a refusal to cooperate will 
“aggravate or intensify” the encounter.126 
People lack knowledge about the repercussions not only of refusing to 
consent, but also of granting their consent. They may believe that 
cooperation will be viewed as evidence of innocence, and therefore the 
police officer might not search at all or will conduct a more cursory 
inspection than if the person did not cooperate.127 They may not know 
that they can limit the scope of the search or revoke consent at any 
time.128 And they may not know that, even if they grant consent, police 
                                                                                                                     
 120. Id. at 36. 
 121. Id. at 39–40. 
 122. See Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12 (noting the Supreme Court’s failure to take into 
account the costs of exercising options other than cooperation).  
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002); Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 431 (1991). 
 124. Greenfield, supra note 7, at 11–12.  
 125. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984). 
 126. See Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 
1013–14 (2002) (noting that when people of color decline a request to search, the refusal “can 
racially aggravate or intensify the encounter, increasing the person of color’s vulnerability to 
physical violence, arrest, or both”). 
 127. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding 
Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1523–24 (2011) (“Perhaps the most pervasive example of an activity 
that law-abiding persons take to avoid a search is, ironically, consenting to a search.”); Burkoff, 
supra note 7, at 1118. 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Clearly a person 
may limit or withdraw his consent to a search, and the police must honor such limitations.”).  
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may still subject them to whatever repercussions they feared as a 
consequence of refusal. 
B.  Lack of Fortitude 
In construing citizens’ apparent cooperation with law enforcement, 
the Court’s jurisprudence also fails to consider the natural tendency of 
people to comply with authority. Evidence from social psychology 
suggests that typical people, even if they realize they have the option not 
to cooperate with law enforcement, may lack the fortitude to do so.129 It 
has been decades since psychologist Stanley Milgram’s influential 
obedience studies demonstrated the power of perceived authority.130 In 
those experiments, subjects were told they would be assisting researchers 
who were studying the educational effects of negative reinforcement.131 
Subjects were led to believe that they were in the role of “teacher,” 
matched with a “learner,” who was actually a confederate of the 
researchers.132 As learners attempted to complete a task involving the 
pairing of random word pairs, teachers were supposed to reinforce 
mistakes with escalating levels of shock, using what appeared to be a 
shock-inducing machine, complete with voltage labels and descriptions 
ranging from “slight shock” to “moderate shock” to “Danger: severe 
shock,” and most daunting of all, “XXX.”133 As the level of (fake) shock 
escalated, so too did the learner’s protests of discomfort and ultimately 
severe pain, followed by foreboding silence.134 Despite this “evidence” of 
the learner’s misery, remarkably few subjects were willing to disobey the 
experimenters.135 In fact, most continued to deliver shocks up to the most 
severe level, even after their learners had fallen into silence.136  
Numerous scholars have drawn on the Milgram studies to argue that 
the Supreme Court has overestimated the fortitude of most people to 
refuse to cooperate with police. 137  Granted, Milgram’s experimental 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 820 (arguing that the social power exhibited by law 
enforcement may explain why persons give consent despite knowing of their right to refuse); 
Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 363–65 (noting that people are likely to respond to the authority 
inherent to a police officer, even when they understand they have a legal right to refuse consent).  
 130. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). 
 131. Id. at 18.   
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 19–20. 
 134. Id. at 22 (“To our consternation, even the strongest protests from the victim did not 
prevent many subjects from administering the harshest punishment ordered by the 
experimenter.”); see also id. at 32–33 (discussing results of the shock experiment in which 
twenty-six of forty subjects continued to shock the victim despite protests and ceasing therefrom).  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 35. 
 137. See, e.g., Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 363–65 (citing Milgram to develop a distinction 
between the “social power” and “legitimate power” underlying authority); Nadler, supra note 9, at 
176–77 (noting some “obvious differences” between consent searches and Milgram’s paradigm, 
but concluding “that in both situations, people are coerced to comply when they would prefer to 
refuse”); Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 187–89 (relying on Milgram’s research to argue that people 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/2
2015] CONSENT SEARCHES AND FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS 529 
 
paradigm is not a perfect analog to a police officer’s request for consent 
to search.138 As Professor Simmons has argued, in Milgram’s studies, the 
researchers used firm commands, and many of the subjects protested 
vigorously, even as they complied.139 The difference between a command 
followed by reluctant compliance, and a request followed by apparent 
cooperation, is important in the Fourth Amendment context. The Court 
has been quick to find voluntary consent as long as police phrase the 
request for consent to search as a question, and not a command.140  
However, language does not exist in a vacuum; listeners interpret 
words in their social context.141 Accordingly, a police officer’s request 
for cooperation, “however gently phrased, is likely to be taken by even 
the toughest citizen as a command.”142 Moreover, this interpretation will 
not always be incorrect in a world in which commands are often couched 
in the language of request. For example, police officers are authorized to 
order a vehicle’s occupants out of the car during a lawful traffic stop.143 
Nevertheless, one could imagine an officer exercising this authority by 
asking, “Do you mind stepping out of the car for me?” rather than stating, 
“I have the authority to order you out of the car, whether you like it or 
not.” That the statement ends with a question mark is not inconsistent 
with the fact that the cars’ occupants do not have a choice but to comply.  
                                                                                                                     
consent to search because of the implicit authority of police); Strauss, supra note 1, at 236–41 
(using Milgram’s research to argue that people are likely to comply with a “request” by 
authorities); Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating 
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 215, 243 (1997) (citing Milgram’s research and other social psychology to argue that 
“innocent suspects, much like guilty suspects, are likely to be unable to meaningfully exercise 
their Fourth Amendment right to exclude the police”).  
 138. Nadler, supra note 9, at 176 (noting the “obvious differences” as well as the similarities 
between the situation “in which Milgram’s subjects found themselves” and the typical 
consent-search scenario).  
 139. Simmons, supra note 3, at 805–07 (maintaining that applying the Milgram experiments 
to consent searches is “problematic at best”). 
 140. See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1823 & n.66 
(1998). 
 141. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 168–72, 179–97 (“The context of discourse is crucial in the 
understanding of it; this is especially true when the speaker is making a request.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 142. UVILLER, supra note 113, at 81; see also Williams, supra note 8, at 89 (“After all, what 
maddens us about the voluntariness locution in consent-search cases is precisely the unreality of 
it—most everyone would feel coerced by the sorts of police encounters that are described 
everyday in our courthouses.”); Janice Nadler & J.D. Trout, The Language of Consent in Police 
Encounters, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 326, 333–36 (Peter M. Tiersma & 
Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012) (maintaining that courts fail to consider context when examining 
the language of police encounters). 
 143. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 & n.6 (1977) (per curiam) (declaring a 
bright-line rule that ordering the driver out of the car during a traffic stop is reasonable and 
describing the intrusion as “de minimis”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) 
(extending Mimms to passengers). 
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Professor Janice Nadler’s insightful work on the language of police 
encounters is especially relevant here. 144  As she has pointed out, 
empirical evidence demonstrates that the relative hierarchy between 
speaker and listener affects the meaning of language.145 For example, in 
one study, researchers asked subjects to assume the role of an employee 
being told, either by a boss or a co-worker, not to be late to work again.146 
When subjects listened to a peer, they heard a directive (“don’t be late 
again”) as more coercive than a suggestion (“try not to be late again”).147 
When a boss was speaking, however, the forcefulness of the language 
was irrelevant. The researchers concluded that “[t]hose who have 
authority apparently need not activate coercive potential through their 
discourse. Their roles are sufficient to do so.”148  
Because police are in a position of authority, regardless of the 
language they use, listeners are unlikely to distinguish between a 
command to search and a request.149 Just as any driver would understand 
from the question, “Can I please see your license and registration?,” that 
she is required to produce the requested items, 150  most people will 
understand an officer’s request to search as a direction to comply. The 
failure of courts to consider the social context of the words police use to 
obtain consent to search is but one example of what Professors Peter 
Tiersma and Lawrence Solan call “selective literalism”—the tendency of 
courts to construe words literally when beneficial to law enforcement, but 
to interpret language within its social context when a literal construction 
might benefit the defendant:  
[T]he problem is not merely that judges sometimes interpret 
the utterances of ordinary people in an overly literal way by 
failing to take pragmatic information into account. Rather, 
judges are selective in when they take pragmatic factors into 
consideration. Whether consciously or not, their interpretive 
practices tend either to ignore or to take into account 
pragmatic information when it benefits police and 
prosecutors. The utterances that police officers make in 
seeking consent to a search are almost invariably deemed to 
be requests, even if the officer poses what is literally an 
informational question or if the circumstances are such that 
                                                                                                                     
 144. See Nadler, supra note 9, at 187–89; Nadler & Trout, supra note 142, at 329–33.  
 145. Nadler, supra note 9, at 188–90.   
 146. Id. at 189 (citing Jennifer L. Vollbrecht et al., Coercive Potential and Face-Sensitivity: 
The Effects of Authority and Directives in Social Confrontations, 8 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 235, 
240 (1997)). 
 147. Id.   
 148. Id. (quoting Vollbrecht et al., supra note 146, at 244) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 149. See id. at 188–89 (“[B]ecause a police officer is perceived as an authority, he need not 
rely on coercive statements to achieve a goal—his role is adequate, and a polite request can 
increase face-sensitivity without reducing coercive power.”).   
 150. See Hibbel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 186–88 (2004) (holding that 
states can pass laws requiring suspects to reveal their identity during a Terry stop). 
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the suspect is likely to interpret the utterance as an order that 
should not be refused.151 
III.  CONSENT: REASONABLENESS, NOT WAIVER 
The failure of the Court to give more weight to a person’s actual 
awareness of the alternatives to compliance,152 or a person’s actual ability 
to exercise those options,153 is incompatible with any requirement that the 
person subjectively intend to grant consent. Seeking to explain the 
disconnect between lay notions of voluntary consent and the Court’s 
apparent conception of it, recent Fourth Amendment scholarship has 
emphasized the role that objective standards of reasonableness play in 
consent jurisprudence, despite the Court’s narrative reliance on 
subjective notions of consent.154 However, the Court’s inquiries into 
reasonableness have been imprecise, perhaps in part because the role of 
reasonableness is hidden. Sometimes the Court examines the 
reasonableness of police officers and at other times the Court examines 
the reasonableness of the citizen. Most hidden of all is the Court’s 
implicit and incorrect analysis of what this Article calls “macro 
reasonableness”—an assessment of whether the consent-search 
exception strikes a reasonable balance between governmental needs and 
individual Fourth Amendment interests.  
A.  Subjective Consent v. Objective Reasonableness 
Though rejecting the requirement of a formal waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights, the Court in Schneckloth nevertheless stated that the 
individual characteristics of the person granting consent, such as age, 
intelligence, and education, were relevant in determining whether the 
defendant’s consent was voluntarily granted.155 This express consideration 
of a defendant’s individual traits appears to treat the voluntariness of a 
citizen’s consent to police activity as a subjective inquiry. In practice, 
however, the Court applies the standard objectively. Professor Marcy Strauss 
                                                                                                                     
151. Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective Literalism in 
American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 229, 256 (2004). 
 152. See supra Section II.A. 
 153. See supra Section II.B.  
 154. E.g., Simmons, supra note 3, at 778–79. 
 155. 412 U.S. 218, 226–27; Simmons, supra note 3, at 778–79 (“The Court went out of its 
way in Schneckloth to say that subjective as well as objective factors were part of the totality of 
the circumstances test—noting that the defendant’s level of schooling, intelligence, and presence 
or absence of any warnings were relevant considerations in determining whether a statement was 
voluntary.”). When the Court uses objective standards, the individual characteristics of the 
defendant generally do not play a role. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 667–68 
(2004) (contrasting Schneckloth factors with the objective inquiry used to determine if someone is 
in custody for Miranda purposes); see also Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. 
Reasonable Lay Persons in the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1495 (2010) (noting that the factual inquiry into voluntary consent 
“is nominally a subjective inquiry” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
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reviewed every consent search case published in a three-year period and 
reported “only a handful of cases” in which courts analyzed the suspect’s 
individual, subjective characteristics.156  
Whenever confronted with a conflict between subjective intention and 
objective appearance, the Court has opted for an objective approach, 
emphasizing that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness.”157 For example, in Illinois v. Rodriguez,158 the Court 
recognized that police could lawfully rely on “apparent” consent to 
search.159 In Rodriguez, a woman who claimed to be the defendant’s 
live-in girlfriend granted the police entry into the defendant’s apartment; 
she referred to the home as “our” apartment, had a key to the entry, and 
had clothes and furniture inside.160 In reality, the woman had moved out 
of the home a month earlier and, according to Rodriguez, retained the key 
without permission.161 Because she lacked authority to consent and he 
did not consent, he sought to suppress the resulting evidence.162 The 
Court upheld the search because the Fourth Amendment’s only guarantee 
is that searches and seizures will be “reasonable,” and the police officers 
who conducted the search had acted reasonably by relying on the 
woman’s apparent authority to permit entry.163  
The Court has also looked to objective standards of reasonableness, 
rather than subjective consent, when determining the scope of a consent 
search. In Florida v. Jimeno,164 the defendant consented to a search of his 
car for drugs without any further discussion of the scope of the search.165 
When the police officer found a folded, brown paper bag on the 
floorboard of the car, he opened it, without seeking further permission, 
and found drugs inside.166 Although the Florida Supreme Court held that 
the consent search of a car does not extend to sealed containers within the 
car absent specific consent for the containers, the Supreme Court 
reversed.167 The scope of a consent search, the Court reasoned, turns not 
on what the defendant actually intended to consent to, but instead on what 
“it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe” about the scope of the 
person’s consent.168 From this perspective, it was “objectively reasonable 
for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondent’s 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Strauss, supra note 1, at 222; see also Mandiberg, supra note 155, at 1495. 
 157. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
 158. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).  
 159. Id. at 187–89.   
 160. Id. at 179.  
 161. Id. at 181. 
 162. Id. at 180.  
 163. Id. at 183–84. 
 164. 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). 
 165. See id. at 249. 
 166. Id. at 249–50. 
 167. Id. at 250. 
 168. Id. at 249. 
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car included consent to search containers within that car which might 
bear drugs.”169 
In the seizure context, the emphasis on reasonableness is even clearer. 
While the Court employs the narrative device of “voluntary consent” to 
determine the legality of a consent search, the doctrinal distinction 
between a seizure and a mere encounter that does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment is not determined by whether the citizen voluntarily 
consents to the interaction. Instead, the relevant inquiry is clearly 
objective in nature, requiring the Court to determine whether a 
“reasonable person” would have believed she was free to leave under the 
circumstances.170 
B.  Officer Reasonableness and Citizen Reasonableness 
Noting the divergence between the Court’s language of voluntary 
consent and the empirical realities, a growing number of scholars have 
characterized consent jurisprudence as a test of reasonableness. 171 
Viewed from this perspective, the Court’s emphasis upon “voluntary 
consent” is mere narrative, while the Court’s “real” concern is about the 
reasonableness of the challenged encounter or search. 
Professor Simmons has offered reasonableness as a “new” paradigm 
for analyzing consent searches. 172  Professor Daniel Williams has 
challenged Simmons’s characterization of reasonableness as a new 
paradigm and asserted that the Court’s emphasis upon the reasonableness 
of consent searches has always been apparent.173 Regardless of whether 
the focus on reasonableness is new, both Professors Simmons and 
Williams characterize the relevant reasonableness inquiry as an objective 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 251.   
 170. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Interestingly, the prosecution appeared to assume that the relevant inquiry was 
subjective, because the Court characterized the government’s argument as follows: “The entire 
encounter was consensual and hence Royer was not being held against his will at all.” Id. at 501. 
However, the Court rejected the prosecution’s argument using an objective test, holding that the 
circumstances—retaining Royer’s ticket and license and failing to tell him he had a right to 
leave—would have led a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. Id. at 502–03. 
 171. Maclin, supra note 109, at 61 (noting the “modern Court’s abandonment of 
Bustamonte’s ‘voluntariness’ test and its substitution of a ‘reasonableness’ test that considers 
only objective facts or criteria”); Simmons, supra note 3, at 822 (offering a “new paradigm” for 
the Court’s consent jurisprudence: “As long as the police officer’s behavior is appropriate, the 
search is reasonable and thus constitutional”); Williams, supra note 8, at 75 (asserting that 
reasonableness “has always been the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis,” including in the 
consent search context); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth 
Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008). 
 172. See Simmons, supra note 3, at 775–76 (enumerating the contours of the “new 
paradigm”). 
 173. Williams, supra note 8, at 93 (“The Court might dress up the analysis with evocative 
metaphysical notions, but only naiveté or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents one 
from seeing that the Court purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess 
reasonableness, which is exactly Professor Simmons’s purported ‘new’ paradigm.”). 
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inquiry into the appropriateness of law enforcement’s conduct.174 In both 
Rodriguez and Jimeno, for example, the Court emphasized the 
reasonableness of the police officers’ conduct in light of the facts known 
to them at the time.175 
The distinction between an objective inquiry into officer 
reasonableness and a true voluntariness standard is perhaps best 
illustrated with a case from the Fifth Amendment context, Colorado v. 
Connelly.176 In Connelly, the defendant approached a police officer and, 
without prompting from the officer, confessed to a murder committed in 
another state.177 At trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statements 
as involuntary, because he was suffering from schizophrenia and was 
hearing voices in his head telling him that he either had to confess or 
commit suicide.178 Though the statements certainly were not “voluntary” 
from a subjective perspective,179 the Court nevertheless held that they 
were voluntary from a constitutional perspective because the state had 
done nothing coercive to affect the defendant’s decision to speak.180 
Professors Melanie Wilson and Tracy Maclin have both explored 
reasonableness as a basis for the Fourth Amendment’s consent-search 
doctrine, but have compellingly demonstrated that the Court considers not 
only the reasonableness of officers, but also the reasonableness of citizens.181 
In the seizure context, the Court examines citizen reasonableness directly 
by finding a “seizure” only where a reasonable person would have felt 
                                                                                                                     
 174. Simmons, supra note 3, at 817 (“The standard should be an objective one, a standard 
that focuses on police conduct and not the subjective consent given by the suspect.”); Williams, 
supra note 8, at 86, 89, 92–93 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent demonstrates that “the 
power to withhold consent is governed by objective considerations, particularly the observable 
conduct of the law enforcement agents” and further providing that the Court’s doctrinal path with 
respect to consent searches has been charted from the “objective ‘reasonableness’ standpoint”). 
 175. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“As with other factual 
determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged 
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” 
(alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 
(1991). For a discussion of the role of reasonableness in both Rodriguez and Jimeno, see supra 
notes 157–69 and accompanying text. 
 176. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 177. Id. at 160.  
 178. See id. at 161. 
 179. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (holding that statements extracted 
under the threat of violence were not voluntary).  
 180. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164–65. 
 181. See Wilson, supra note 171 (discussing the role that “citizen reasonableness” plays in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Maclin, supra note 109, at 65–67 (using the majority opinion 
in Drayton to demonstrate the modern Court’s tendency to treat citizens as having a 
“responsibility to know and assert their rights and tell the police to leave them alone”). See 
generally Mandiberg, supra note 155, at 1483 (exploring officer reasonableness and “lay person” 
reasonableness in the Miranda and several Fourth Amendment contexts, and demonstrating that 
the Court permits reasonable officers more room for error in their “perceptions, knowledge, 
emotions, or behavior”).  
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like he was not free to leave.182 Though the test in the search context 
sounds more subjective (voluntary consent), the Court has sometimes 
blurred the seemingly subjective consent-search doctrine with the 
objective free-to-leave doctrine, stating that both encounters and searches 
are consensual as long as “a reasonable person would understand that he 
or she could refuse to cooperate.”183  
In both contexts, the Court’s examination of reasonableness reveals a 
distinctive worldview about police–citizen dynamics. When it comes to 
officer reasonableness, the Court assumes that there is nothing inherently 
objectionable about a police officer requesting cooperation from 
citizens,184 and therefore no explanation need be given for the request. 
Instead, the Court assumes that an officer’s request (as opposed to a 
command) necessarily conveys a citizen’s right to refuse to cooperate.185 
When it comes to citizen reasonableness, the Court assumes that 
reasonable people are able to recognize the right to refuse and to exercise 
it affirmatively.186 
In practice, inquiries into officer reasonableness and citizen 
reasonableness will blur.187 A court examining the appropriateness of law 
enforcement conduct might assess its coercive impact upon the 
reasonable citizen, while a court examining the effect of police conduct 
on the reasonable citizen is likely to take into account the reasonableness 
of the police conduct. 188  Consider the combination of California v. 
Hodari D.189 and Illinois v. Wardlow190 from this perspective. In Hodari 
D., the defendant ran from police and then “tossed away” a rock of 
cocaine during the ensuing foot chase.191 To determine whether the police 
had the requisite level of suspicion to seize Hodari D., the Court first had 
to determine when the seizure occurred. 192  Adding a gloss to the 
traditional free-to-leave test, the Court held that to be seized, the 
defendant had to either submit to a show of police authority (the 
free-to-leave test) or be physically seized.193 Because the suspect did not 
submit to the police officer’s attempts to stop him, “he was not seized 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court).  
 183. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991); see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194, 205–06 (2002). 
 184. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200–01. 
 185. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 431.   
 186. Maclin, supra note 109, at 65. 
 187. Simmons, supra note 3, at 817 & n.216 (“This is probably a distinction without a 
difference.”). 
 188. See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 16.03[B], at 266 (“The real issue for 
courts is whether the police methods of obtaining consent are morally acceptable to us in view of 
law enforcement goals.”). 
 189. 499 U.S. 621 (1991). 
 190. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 191. 499 U.S. at 623. 
 192. Id. at 623–24. 
 193. Id. at 626–27. 
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until he was tackled.”194 Subsequently, in Wardlow, the Court held that 
“unprovoked” flight from police can be treated as suspicious conduct in 
determining whether a subsequent seizure is supported by reasonable 
suspicion.195  
The doctrinal package resulting from Hodari D. and Wardlow can be 
viewed as the Court’s assessment of the reasonableness of either police or 
citizen conduct. As a determination of police reasonableness, the Court’s 
decisions reflect the belief that there is nothing inappropriate about police 
chasing people who run from them. As a determination of citizen 
reasonableness, the Court reveals its belief that reasonable people, though 
free to decline police cooperation, will do so through words of resistance 
rather than through flight. 
Whether examining the reasonableness of officer conduct or citizen 
conduct, the Court’s inquiry into reasonableness in these contexts is not 
completely divorced from the question of coercion. While reasonableness 
provides an explanatory paradigm for consent jurisprudence, the 
fundamental inquiry is still grounded in the coercion/consent dichotomy. 
The Court may not examine voluntary consent from a subjective 
perspective, but the Court does consider reasonableness from the 
perspective of coercion: Have the police resorted to overly coercive 
tactics, and would a reasonable person (as imagined by the Court) feel 
coerced? It also analyzes reasonableness at a “micro” level, examining 
the totality of circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine the 
permissibility of an encounter or search. 
C.  Macro-Level Reasonableness 
A different type of reasonableness inquiry is what this Article refers to 
as “macro reasonableness.” Professor Orin Kerr explains the distinction 
between the Court’s micro- and macro-level fact finding in Fourth 
Amendment cases nicely: 
A micro-scale inquiry focuses on the exact facts of the case 
before the court, such as what the officer did or what 
information he obtained. In contrast, a macro-scale inquiry 
looks to characteristics of the general type of government 
conduct, of which the case at hand is merely one example.196  
Usually when the Court sets aside the warrant clause to focus on 
reasonableness, it does so by balancing the interests of law enforcement 
                                                                                                                     
 194. Id. at 629. 
 195. 528 U.S. at 125. 
 196. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 523 
(2007). To illustrate the micro-level analysis, Professor Kerr uses an example of a police officer 
who searches a suspect’s mail. At the micro level, the Court might examine whether the officer 
violated any laws by examining the mail and the quality of the information obtained from the 
search. Id. at 523 n.106. At the macro level, the Court might treat the case as just one example of 
a larger set of cases involving searches of the mail and seek to develop a rule specifically 
addressed to the privacy of mail. Id. 
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against the level of intrusion to the individual.197 Consider Terry v. Ohio 
as an example of the Court examining reasonableness at both the micro 
and macro levels.198 Terry is best known for its holding that police may 
conduct a brief, investigatory seizure of a person, without a warrant and 
without probable cause, as long as the officer has a “reasonable 
suspicion” that crime is afoot.199 An individual motion to suppress based 
on Terry requires a court to engage in multiple determinations of 
micro-level reasonableness. First, to constitute a seizure at all under the 
Fourth Amendment, the circumstances must have been such that a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. 200  Second, to 
constitute a Terry stop, as opposed to an arrest that requires probable 
cause,201 the duration and scope of the stop must be reasonable in light of 
the investigatory steps necessary to quell or confirm the suspicions giving 
rise to the seizure.202 Finally, if the seizure does constitute a Terry stop, it 
must be supported by “reasonable suspicion,” which requires the Court to 
determine whether an “objectively reasonable police officer” would have 
suspected that the suspect was engaged in criminal activity.203 
Those micro-level reasonableness determinations arise in hundreds of 
cases per day. However, the underlying reasonable-suspicion doctrine 
stems from Terry’s initial, macro-level analysis of reasonableness. In 
Terry, the Court considered—and rejected—two opposing regimes for 
judicial involvement in brief, street-level investigatory stops: that they 
should be treated as entirely outside the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment,204 or that they should be subject to the default requirement 
of a warrant based on probable cause.205 As to the former, the Court 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (“The touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on 
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999))); Cynthia Lee, 
Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of the Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1133, 1140, 1144 (2012) (describing the “reasonableness” balancing test).  
 198. See 392 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1968). 
 199. Id. at 24–26, 29–30. 
 200. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1983) (plurality opinion); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980) (Stewart, J., opinion of the Court). 
 201. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415–16 (1976). 
 202. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (ruling that in assessing the 
reasonableness of the length of detention, the Court “consider[s] it appropriate to examine 
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant”); id. at 691 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“Regardless how efficient it may be for law enforcement officials to 
engage in prolonged questioning to investigate a crime, or how reasonable in light of law 
enforcement objectives it may be to detain a suspect until various inquiries can be made and 
answered, a seizure that in duration, scope, or means goes beyond the bounds of Terry cannot be 
reconciled with the Fourth Amendment in the absence of probable cause.” (emphasis added)).  
 203. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).  
 204. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–17.  
 205. See id. at 20.   
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dismissed as “fantastic” the notion that a “stop and frisk” was of no 
constitutional consequence.206 As to the latter, the Court recognized that 
the nature of a stop and frisk required “necessarily swift action predicated 
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat,” rendering 
the warrant requirement impracticable.207 Rejecting a “rigid all-or-nothing 
model,”208 the Court instead held that a stop and frisk implicates the 
Fourth Amendment, but would be evaluated pursuant to the “general 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.”209 
A generalized look at reasonableness requires the Court to balance the 
governmental interests served by the challenged police conduct against 
the level of intrusion to the privacy and liberty interests protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.210 Applying this balancing test to stops, the Court in 
Terry emphasized both the legitimate interests of law enforcement to 
investigate suspicious circumstances that reasonably indicate criminal 
activity, and the relatively brief detention of the stopped individual.211 
Turning to the reasonableness of a frisk for weapons, the Court weighed 
the legitimate interests of police officers in protecting their safety during 
investigatory stops, and the limited intrusiveness of an inspection for 
weapons.212  
Importantly, the Court has expressly looked to the macro-level 
reasonableness balance to shape the micro-level doctrine governing stops 
and frisks on a case-by-case basis. Stops cannot take longer than 
reasonably necessary because the government’s interest in quick, 
on-the-spot decision-making decreases, while the level of intrusion to the 
defendant increases.213 To preserve the reasonableness balance, the Court 
will treat an overly lengthy or intrusive stop as a de facto arrest (thereby 
triggering the probable cause requirement), even if the police officer does 
not intend to elevate the stop to an arrest, or does not announce to the 
defendant that she is under arrest. 214 The lawful scope of a frisk is 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Id. at 16.  
 207. Id. at 20. 
 208. Id. at 17. 
 209. Id. at 20. 
 210. Id. at 20–21.  
 211. Id. at 22–24, 26. 
 212. Id. at 25–27. 
 213. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–88 (1985); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20 
(“[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were ‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual 
one—whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”). 
 214. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (providing that although Court precedent obscures the 
distinction between investigative Terry stops and de facto arrests, “if an investigative stop 
continues indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop”); 
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979) (holding that unlike the brief and narrowly 
circumscribed intrusions involved in Terry and its progeny, “the detention of petitioner was in 
important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest” where the petitioner was 
transported to a police station in a police car, placed in an interrogation room, and questioned 
without being told that he was free to leave); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969).  
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similarly determined by macro-level considerations of reasonableness. 
The moment a police officer begins to search for anything other than a 
weapon, the reasonableness balance changes.215 The government is no 
longer advancing its interest in officer safety, and the nature of the search 
becomes more intrusive. Accordingly, the Court has adopted a bright-line 
rule that the only legitimate aim of a frisk is to locate weapons.216 A 
search for evidence, no matter how brief, changes the reasonableness 
balance, re-triggering the default rule requiring probable cause and a 
warrant.217  
It is not only in the stop and frisk context that the Court looks to 
notions of macro reasonableness to shape Fourth Amendment doctrine. A 
macro-level balance of governmental interests against intrusions to 
individual liberty and privacy is at the heart of the doctrinal rules 
governing special needs searches, 218  roadblocks, 219  administrative 
searches, 220  community caretaking searches, 221  inventory searches, 222 
protective sweeps, 223  searches incident to arrest, 224  and an officer’s 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 26 (contrasting frisks from typical searches because a “protective 
search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person”); 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 17.07[B][2] 
(“If an officer feels no object during a pat-down, or she feels an object that does not appear to be 
a weapon, no further search is justifiable under Terry, which is based exclusively on the concern 
for the officer’s safety.”).  
 216. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 26–27; Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373, 377 
(1993); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that Terry authorizes a limited frisk 
for weapons).  
 217. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (finding an officer’s search to be 
impermissible under Terry where the justification for the search was to find narcotics rather than 
to search for weapons); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325–29 (1987) (holding that probable 
cause is required to search for evidence, even when the search is alleged to be cursory). 
 218. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–38, 340–41 (1985); O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 715–25 (1987) (plurality opinion); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 618–25, 627 (1989); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–72 
(1989); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–59, 661–64 (1995); Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14, 318–21 (1997); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 
78–86 (2001); Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828–32, 834–36 (2002).  
 219. See Mich. Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1980); City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–44, 46–48 (2000) (providing that the constitutionality 
of checkpoint programs conducted by law enforcement “depends on a balancing of the competing 
interests at stake and the effectiveness of the program”); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425–28 
(2004) (balancing the gravity of the public interest served by the seizure, the degree to which the 
checkpoint seizure advances public interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual liberty).  
 220. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–39 (1967) (providing that in the 
municipal code enforcement context—as opposed to the criminal investigation context—there is 
no ready test for “determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against 
the invasion which the search entails”); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543–46 (1967). 
 221. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439–43, 446–48 (1973).  
 222. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–76 (1976) (upholding the 
reasonableness of administrative searches in light of the “distinct needs” served by such searches); 
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643–48 (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–76 
(1987).  
 223. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331–37 (1990). 
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directives that drivers225 or passengers226 exit a vehicle during a traffic 
stop. In each context, the Court determined that the usual warrant and 
probable cause requirements that serve as a default proxy for 
reasonableness were inappropriate. In the absence of this requirement, the 
Court turned to a macro-level determination of reasonableness by 
weighing the governmental interests served by the category of search 
against the nature and level of the intrusion to citizen interests. However, 
when it comes to the consent-search exception to the warrant 
requirement, the Court has silently bypassed this usual macro-level 
balancing test to determine reasonableness. To be sure, some language in 
Schneckloth appears to invoke a kind of balancing test. Specifically, the 
Court noted the need to accommodate the “two competing concerns” of 
“the legitimate need for [consent] searches and the equally important 
requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.”227 But assessing the 
level of coercion upon an individual is not the same as the Court’s usual 
measure of Fourth Amendment costs to the individual: liberty and 
privacy. Instead of citing the usual measure of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, the Court in Schneckloth expressly borrowed this 
balancing equation from the Fifth Amendment case law that governs 
police questioning. 228  That confession law has been built around a 
compulsion/consent dichotomy is unsurprising given the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that no person be “compelled” to be a witness 
against himself. 229 
However, the emphasis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are 
different. The Fourth Amendment protects individual privacy and liberty 
interests against unreasonable interference by the state. Moreover, the 
default measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a warrant based 
on probable cause.230 The standard of probable cause ensures that there is 
some level of individualized suspicion to justify interference with a 
                                                                                                                     
 224. In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), for example, the Court limited the ability of 
police to search an arrestee’s car—incident to an arrest—to instances in which the defendant was 
either arrested while still in reach of the car’s passenger compartment, or in which police had 
reason to believe that the car contained evidence of the crime for which the defendant was 
arrested. Id. at 335. The Court rejected a more expansive reading of the search incident to arrest to 
preserve the proper balance between the government’s interests and the arrestee’s privacy 
interests in his car. Id. at 344, 351. 
 225. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–11 (1977). 
 226. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411–15 (1997). 
 227. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 228. Id. at 227–28; see also id. at 280 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court assumes that the 
issue in this case is: what are the standards by which courts are to determine that consent is 
voluntarily given? It then imports into the law of search and seizure standards developed to 
decide entirely different questions about coerced confessions.” (emphasis added)). 
 229. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 230. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 2, § 8.01; see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by 
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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citizen’s privacy and liberty interests,231 and the requirement of a warrant 
ensures that a neutral decision maker acts as a check on the discretion of 
law enforcement, whose judgment might be clouded by the competitive 
enterprise of crime-fighting.232 Though the Court has recognized so many 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that the exceptions swallow the 
rule, it has done so by looking at “macro reasonableness.” 
In the consent context, however, the Court has treated the citizen’s 
voluntary, consensual participation in an investigation as an alternative 
proxy for reasonableness. However valid a citizen’s true, voluntary 
consent might be to establish reasonableness, this Article demonstrates 
that, as applied by the Court, the concept of “voluntary consent” is a 
myth. The Court’s “fictional”233 measure of voluntary consent is not the 
kind of true voluntary consent that would be required in the Fifth 
Amendment confession context from which the Court borrowed the 
doctrine. For example, in the confession context, Miranda v. Arizona234 
supplements the core Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination by creating an irrebuttable presumption that custodial 
interrogation is compelled unless the defendant first waives his Miranda 
rights.235  
While the Court has injected notions of Fifth Amendment compulsion 
into the Fourth Amendment consent context, it has declined to require 
proof of waiver,236 proof that the defendant knew he had a right to 
refuse,237 or even any showing that the citizen subjectively desired to 
                                                                                                                     
 231. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949); see City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (noting “the general rule that a search must be based on 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (requiring 
probable cause to believe an item may be seized in order to invoke the “plain view” doctrine, to 
ensure against “a general exploratory search from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 232. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1947) (noting that the Fourth 
Amendment’s “protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
 233. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
 234. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 235. See id. at  444, 461 (“An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police 
custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of 
persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak.”); 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, 
supra note 2, § 24.04[C][1], at 443–44 (noting that a common reading of Miranda was that 
compulsion inheres to custodial interrogation to such a degree that any confession is compelled in 
that context, and therefore “in the absence of procedural safeguards . . . custodial interrogation 
necessarily will—not simply can—result in unconstitutional compulsion”). 
 236. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235, 246 (1973); see supra Section III.A. 
 237. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206–07 (2002) (“The Court has rejected in 
specific terms the suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to 
refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”); Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 432, 435 (1991); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 227. 
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participate. 238  Instead, the Court resorts to objective notions of 
“reasonableness,” arguing that reasonableness is the touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment.239 But the kind of “reasonableness” that silently 
drives Fourth Amendment consent law is not the same kind of 
“reasonableness” that drives the Fourth Amendment. 
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the dissent noted the difference between the 
micro-level reasonableness emphasized by the majority in upholding the 
search based on apparent third-party consent, and the macro-level 
reasonableness that concerned the dissenting Justices.240 To the majority, 
the search of the defendant’s apartment was reasonable because the 
police officers, however mistaken, reasonably believed that they had 
obtained voluntary consent from a person authorized to give it.241 Even 
though several scholars have cited the Court’s third-party consent cases 
as a clear example where the Court relied on notions of “reasonableness” 
to approve a consent search,242 the dissent correctly noted that the Court’s 
so-called “reasonableness” assessment (a form of micro-level analysis) 
was not the traditional Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” assessment 
(a macro-level analysis):  
Instead of judging the validity of consent searches, as we 
have in the past, based on whether a defendant has in fact 
limited his expectation of privacy, the Court today carves out 
an additional exception to the warrant requirement for 
third-party consent searches without pausing to consider 
whether the exigencies of the situation make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Where 
this free-floating creation of “reasonable” exceptions to the 
warrant requirement will end, now that the Court has 
departed from the balancing approach that has long been part 
of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is unclear. But by 
allowing a person to be subjected to a warrantless search in 
his home without his consent and without exigency, the 
majority has taken away some of the liberty that the Fourth 
Amendment was designed to protect.243  
                                                                                                                     
 238. See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 155–69 and accompanying text. 
 240. See 497 U.S. 177, 190 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 186 (majority opinion).  
 242. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 3; Williams, supra note 8; Maclin, supra note 109, at 
61.  
 243. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 198 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The dissent’s point is distinguishable from the argument made in this 
Article, because the dissent did not question the lawfulness of a search premised on the 
defendant’s own “voluntary consent,” a term that most commentators agree does not comport 
with the Court’s application of that term. 
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Because the Court has lost sight of macro reasonableness, it has failed to 
look to the balance of governmental and individual Fourth Amendment 
interests as it has shaped consent-search doctrine.  
IV.  CURRENT CONSENT SEARCHES: ARE THEY (MACRO-LEVEL) 
REASONABLE? 
Despite the recent scholarly attention to the shadow role that 
reasonableness plays in consent-search doctrine, the Court has largely 
overlooked the macro-level assessment of a reasonable balance between 
governmental and Fourth Amendment interests. However, the Court’s 
decisions reveal an implicit assumption that the doctrine it has created 
under the myth of consent does, in fact, satisfactorily balance 
governmental interests and individual liberty and privacy interests. 
A.  The Court’s Fondness for Consent 
Professor Nadler has observed that the Court’s view “appears to be 
that consent searches ought to be encouraged (or at least not discouraged) 
because they reinforce the rule of law.”244 Professor Strauss has aptly 
noted that “a laundry list of law enforcement benefits from consent 
searches have been oft-repeated in the case law, with little real 
discussion.”245 Professor Maclin has described the Court’s fondness for 
the consent doctrine as “zeal to approve consent searches.”246 Consider, 
for example, the Court’s evaluation of the interests at stake in 
Schneckloth: 
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit 
activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search 
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of 
obtaining important and reliable evidence. In the present case 
for example, while the police had reason to stop the car for 
traffic violations, the State does not contend that there was 
probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search was 
incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the 
search yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a 
prosecution, and provided some assurance that others, wholly 
innocent of the crime, were not mistakenly brought to trial. And 
in those cases where there is probable cause to arrest or 
search, but where the police lack a warrant, a consent search 
may still be valuable. If the search is conducted and proves 
fruitless, that in itself may convince the police that an arrest 
with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, or 
that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not 
justified. In short, a search pursuant to consent may result in 
considerably less inconvenience for the subject of the search, 
                                                                                                                     
 244. Nadler, supra note 9, at 210. 
 245. Strauss, supra note 1, at 265. 
 246. Maclin, supra note 109, at 30.  
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and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally permissible and 
wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.247 
Notice the assumptions the Court implicitly makes in its cost/benefit 
analysis. In first analyzing the benefit to the State, the Court uses the 
example of a case in which the police rely on consent under 
circumstances in which they would otherwise be unable to arrest or 
search, and then found something incriminating. When discussing the 
costs to the citizen, however, the Court uses an example in which the 
police do have another basis to search or arrest, but a consent search that 
yields nothing persuades them to leave the citizen alone. As a cost/benefit 
calculation, the Court’s analysis is remarkable in its incompleteness. 
First, by looking only at scenarios in which the police find something 
incriminating when they otherwise would not, or end up exonerating 
someone who otherwise was the basis of suspicion, the Court looks only 
at the potential benefits of consent. Perhaps more importantly, there is no 
reason to believe that these two scenarios make up the bulk of consent 
cases. Looking only at the two types of cases mentioned, one would have 
to believe that police suspicion is so inversely correlated with actual guilt 
that they are very likely to find something when they suspect nothing, but 
are likely to find nothing when they have reason to suspect something. 
B.  Macro Reasonableness: The 2x2 Matrix  
A true reasonableness analysis of consent searches should examine 
the costs and benefits of four different categories of cases, created by a 
full consideration of the two distinctions the Court alluded to in 
Schneckloth. First, as the Court has acknowledged in both the 
free-to-leave and consent-search contexts, sometimes police rely on 
consent to justify their investigation, even when alternative doctrines 
would allow them to engage in the same conduct without the defendant’s 
consent. Second, sometimes searches turn up something incriminating, 
and other times they yield nothing. This two-by-two matrix results in four 
categories of cases, only two of which the Court explored in Schneckloth. 
The two scenarios explored in Schneckloth are: cases where evidence is 
yielded (“guilty”) in a consensual action that otherwise could not occur 
(“consent only”); and cases where no evidence is yielded (“innocent”) 
when the action could have been justified by another doctrine (“consent is 
redundant”). The other two categories of cases are: cases where evidence 
is yielded (“guilty”) when the action could have been justified by another 
doctrine (“consent is redundant”); and cases where no evidence is yielded 
(“innocent”) in a consensual action that otherwise would not occur 
(“consent only”).  
                                                                                                                     
 247. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). Similarly, in explaining that the “community has a real interest in encouraging consent,” 
the Court reasoned that “the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and 
prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly 
charged with a criminal offense.” Id. at 243. 
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 Consent is Redundant (CR) Consent Only (CO) 
Guilty (G) [unaddressed in Schneckloth] Addressed in Schneckloth: 
“Free” evidence 
Innocent (I) Addressed in Schneckloth: 
No cost to D. Possible benefit if 
D is spared arrest once 
exonerated. 
[unaddressed in Schneckloth] 
1.  Consent Only/Guilty 
Consider first the two boxes of the matrix discussed in Schneckloth 
(G/CO and I/CR). In the upper-right-hand corner are consent searches 
that yield incriminating evidence where police lacked any other 
justification for inspection (G/CO). This is the heart of what the Court 
sees as the benefit to the current jurisprudence, where the government 
gets “free” evidence against the guilty. There are two problems with 
placing too much weight on this upside to consent searches. First, 
because the current doctrine does not require the government to specify 
its reasons for requesting consent,248 it is impossible to know how many 
consent-search cases are consent-only searches, and how many consent 
searches would take place regardless of the doctrine.249 Accordingly, 
courts that uphold “other justification” searches under the doctrine of 
consent may overstate the evidentiary benefit of the doctrine because the 
officers likely could have conducted a search through another exception 
or by obtaining a warrant. Second, even when consent searches truly yield 
“free” evidence, a “macro” look at reasonableness requires those gains to 
be balanced against the considerations of individual liberty and privacy. 
2.  Consent Redundant/Innocent 
As to consent searches that yield no evidence when the police had 
alternative justifications for investigation (CR/I), the Court assumes these 
searches benefit the defendant because they may persuade the police not 
to do something more intrusive, like conduct a custodial arrest to trigger 
the search incident to arrest doctrine. 250  Once again, this reasoning 
                                                                                                                     
 248. See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The 
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 536 (2001).   
 249. See Maclin, supra note 109, at 32–33 (describing the Schneckloth Court’s claim that 
consent may be the only means to obtain evidence as a “naked assumption without empirical 
support”); Strauss, supra note 1, at 261 (“Consent searches often are used in circumstances where 
the police also have probable cause to search, but don’t want to go to the ‘trouble’ of getting a 
warrant.”). 
 250. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest, police are allowed to search an arrestee and the 
area within his immediate reach for weapons and evidence, without either a warrant or probable 
cause to search. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 772–73 (1969); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 355 (2009) (applying Chimel to searches of automobiles incident to arrest and stating 
that “the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
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overstates the benefits to law enforcement and understates the costs to 
privacy. First, the scope of a consent search may be broader than another 
justification.251 For example, consent to search an automobile is presumed 
to include the trunk,252 while a search incident to arrest of one of the car’s 
occupants would include, at most, the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle.253 Similarly, reasonable suspicion that a lawfully detained person 
may be armed and dangerous justifies a frisk for weapons, but an officer 
might instead ask the suspect for permission to search his pockets, 
without limiting the scope of the search. Second, if police would have 
conducted the search anyway, but are relying on putative consent, there is 
nothing for the affected person to challenge. Because there is no basis for 
challenging the search, there are no repercussions to the officer for having 
formed an inaccurate suspicion, and these are precisely the cases where 
we should want police correction. 
3.  Consent Only/Innocent 
That leaves the two boxes of the matrix that were unaddressed in 
Schneckloth. The lower-right-hand box is the simplest and holds the 
clearest disadvantages to Fourth Amendment interests. When police 
engage in a consent search with no other justification, and the search 
yields nothing (CO/I), there is no advantage to the government in finding 
“free” evidence, as the Court in Schneckloth emphasized for CO/G 
searches. And unlike searches where no evidence is found, but consent is 
a redundant justification to search (CR/I), the individual is not being 
spared some more intrusive police conduct pursuant to another exception 
to the warrant requirement. In cases where the individual’s consent is 
truly voluntary, there might be no significant cost to privacy, but we have 
seen that the Court’s consent doctrine does not require true consent, only 
the reasonable appearance of it.254 Accordingly, compared to the two 
                                                                                                                     
arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search”).   
 251. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1, at 5 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that one 
“benefit” of consent searches is, “At least when the consenting party does not carefully condition 
or qualify his consent, that the search pursuant to consent may often be of a somewhat broader 
scope than would be possible under a search warrant” (footnote omitted)). 
 252. United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 
1233 (1991) (“Consent to search a car means to search the entire car and whatever is in it, unless 
such consent is otherwise restricted.”); see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) (rejecting 
state court holding that “if the police wish to search closed containers within a car they must 
separately request permission to search each container” and holding instead that the search may 
extend to particular containers if the consent given “would reasonably be understood to extend to 
a particular container”).  
 253. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (limiting police authority to search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest to cases in which the 
arrestee is within reach of the passenger compartment at the time of the search, or when police 
have reason to believe that the car contains evidence of the crime for which the arrestee is in 
custody).  
 254. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 212–23.   
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categories of cases discussed in Schneckloth, this box of the matrix 
appears to contain nothing but costs. 
The only arguable benefit conferred by CO/I searches is if they 
prevent police from needlessly investigating the individual further.255 
However, this argument rests on two questionable assumptions. First, it 
assumes that one unsuccessful search will suffice to halt a police 
investigation, which may not always hold true, especially where there is a 
basis for police suspicion. Second, it assumes that if an individual refuses 
to consent, the police will continue to investigate, which may not always 
hold true, especially when there is no basis for police suspicion. In sum, a 
CO/I search confers benefits only when two conditions are met: police 
suspicion is such that the police would have continued to investigate 
absent the consent search, but then discontinue the investigation once the 
consent search yields no evidence.256  
Consent-only searches also carry the heaviest implications for equality. 
When there is no other justification for the search, the odds are higher that 
police are requesting consent, either consciously or unconsciously, based on 
racial or other stereotypes. 257  Data demonstrating that “hit” rates for 
searches are lowest when police search people of color support this 
inference.258  
Though it is impossible to know what percentage of consent searches 
might be supported by some other justification, there is every reason to 
believe that most consent searches fall within this cost-heavy CO/I box. 
First, the number of consent searches as an absolute number is high,259 
and the overwhelming majority of them yield nothing incriminating.260 
Moreover, the higher the frequency of consent searches, the less likely 
                                                                                                                     
 255. For example, even in the absence of any other applicable exception to the warrant 
requirement, police could engage in a number of investigatory strategies that fall outside the scope 
of a “search” or a “seizure” as the Court has defined those terms. See supra Section I.A.  
 256. This Article’s normative recommendation attempts to retains this benefit by permitting 
consent searches that are based on reasonable suspicion. See infra Part V. 
 257. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536–37 (noting that “consensual encounters are more 
likely to be used against minorities and the poor”); George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a 
New Approach to Consent Searches, 73 MISS. L.J. 525, 551–52 (2003) (noting that because 
police “can approach anyone on the street to ask for consent and can ask any driver who is stopped 
for a traffic infraction for consent, police are presently free to use race, and only race, to decide 
when to ask for consent in a huge number of situations”). 
 258. See David Cole, Profiles in Policing, 26 CHAMPION 12, 16 (2002). 
 259. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 260. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1656 (noting a “staggering shortfall between the 
enormous burden [consent] searches impose and their fruitfulness”); Nadler, supra note 9, at 210 
& n.198 (“The vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.”); see, e.g., 
Chanenson, supra note 13, at 458 (“The vast majority of consent searches in the highway context 
appear to yield no evidence.”); Robert H. Whorf, Consent Searches Following Routine Traffic 
Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 1, 23–24 (2001) (using data from Ohio to demonstrate that 10,000 consent searches took 
place per year during routine traffic stops, with only two to four percent of searches yielding 
evidence of wrongdoing). 
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they are to result in evidence.261 It only stands to reason that consent 
searches conducted with no other justification are the least likely to yield 
evidence.262 Nevertheless, the Court has failed to consider the overall 
costs of these searches to Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
4.  Consent Redundant/Guilty 
Finally, in the upper-left-hand corner of the matrix, are consent 
searches that would have been lawful without consent, and which yield 
incriminating evidence (CR/G). As an initial matter, one might wonder 
why a police officer would request consent if another justification would 
support the search. Because current doctrine does not require any level of 
suspicion or other basis for requesting consent, a common philosophy is 
that, regardless of whether police have cause to search, it does not hurt to 
ask.263 Indeed, police are commonly instructed that requests to search are 
not only harmless, but smart practice.264 As previously discussed, if there 
is no other justification to search, consent may be the only option.265 Even 
when police have another justification to search, consent is so frequently 
given, 266  and so easy to prove, 267  that it will always be in the 
government’s interest to seek consent rather than risk a failure to prove 
the presence of the alternative justification. As one leading police 
resource suggests, “It’s always a good idea to have at least two ways to 
skin the search-and-seizure cat.”268 Accordingly, it is common for police 
                                                                                                                     
 261. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536 & n.145.  
 262. Indeed, though empirical evidence is limited, it appears that consent searches that take 
place in contexts where suspicion is lacking are, as expected, unlikely to yield incriminating 
evidence. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(observing that in bus sweeps absent any particular suspicion, “the percentage of successful drug 
interdictions is low” despite the fact that the police may engage in a “tremendously high volume 
of searches”) (citing United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving a 
sweep of 100 buses that resulted in seven arrests)); United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 500 
(2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., dissenting) (noting that searches in the absence of any particular 
suspicion by the DEA at the airport in Buffalo, New York, produced only ten arrests among 600 
detained travelers).  
 263. See, e.g., Rotenberg, supra note 11, at 190 (noting California Attorney General’s advice 
to peace officers).  
 264. See, e.g., id. at 190 (noting that officers are trained to ask for consent, even when they 
have other authority to search); Devallis Rutledge, Consent Searches: Extracting the Rules from 
17 Supreme Court Decisions, POLICE MAG. (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/
channel/patrol/articles/2013/02/consent-searches.aspx (describing consent as an “excellent” legal 
justification for searching); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, CONSENT SEARCHES 1 
(2007), available at http://le.alcoda.org/publications/files/CONSENTSEARCHES.pdf (advising 
police that “seeking consent to search for evidence is not only harmless, it’s often smart”). 
 265. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“In situations where the police 
have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search 
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence.”); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 264, at 1 (noting that “when 
officers lack probable cause for a warrant, a consent search may be their only option”).  
 266. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 85–99 and accompanying text. 
 268. Rutledge, supra note 264. 
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to seek consent for searches they would likely conduct, regardless of 
consent, pursuant to one of the many other exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.269 
At first blush, any search with consent and an alternative justification 
that also yields incriminating evidence (CR/G) would appear to be 
cost-neutral to individual Fourth Amendment interests. Even without 
consent, the police would conduct the search and discover the same 
evidence pursuant to the other justification. Indeed, having these searches 
occur via consent rather than the alternative justifications conceivably 
confers practical benefits. A growing body of literature on procedural 
justice teaches us that when people perceive a decision-making process to 
be fair, they are more likely to accept the outcome of that process, even if 
the decision itself is adverse.270 These lessons suggest that suspects who 
believe they were given a choice in whether they were searched might be 
more likely to perceive the search as being legitimate271 and therefore less 
intrusive on their Fourth Amendment interests. Having these searches 
upheld under the doctrine of consent may also result in efficiencies in 
litigation, avoiding the uncertainties of doctrines based on fact-specific 
standards like exigency, probable cause, and reasonable suspicion. 
However, applying the consent doctrine to searches that police would 
have conducted even absent consent also extracts costs, and these costs 
vary depending on whether the individual grants or refuses consent. 
Consider first the situation in which the suspect refuses to give consent 
that would have been redundant to another justification. The police, 
because they have other grounds for search, will likely conduct the search 
anyway. That search will be lawful, but notice what the individual is 
likely to learn from this experience: that a request for consent to search is 
                                                                                                                     
 269. For example, because the government successfully argued in Drayton that the 
defendants were free to leave and voluntarily consented to be searched, the government never had 
to articulate either reasonable suspicion to support a seizure or probable cause to justify a search. 
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199, 203–04 (2002). However, by the time Drayton 
provided consent to search, police already knew that he was dressed in heavy, baggy clothes on a 
hot day and was traveling with someone who had already been tied to drugs. Id. at 199. Rather 
than hold that any seizure of Drayton was justified, the Court instead reasoned, “The fact the 
officers may have had reasonable suspicion does not prevent them from relying on a citizen’s 
consent to the search.” Id. at 207. 
 270. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME 
& JUST. 283, 286 (2003); Tom Tyler et al., Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures 
Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. 913, 923, 925 (1996); see TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 196 (2002) (“[P]eople’s main 
consideration when evaluating the police and the courts is the treatment that they feel people 
receive from those authorities.”). See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83–90 (1971). 
 271. Research demonstrates that people are more likely to be satisfied with a process when 
they have been given an opportunity to participate by expressing their side of the story. Tom 
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 94 (2004); 
Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: 
Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 380–81 
(2003). 
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no “request” at all. This commonplace practice creates a feedback loop 
that adds to the perception—dismissed by the Court as 
unreasonable—that people do not have an actual choice in whether to 
submit to a so-called “consent” search.272 
Now consider the suspect who grants consent to a search that police 
would have conducted anyway. For example, the suspect might be 
lawfully stopped, and the police officer might believe there is reasonable 
suspicion to justify a check of the suspect’s backpack for weapons,273 but 
she might request consent to search as an alternative justification.274 
Similarly, the officer might believe she has probable cause to justify the 
search of a car under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement,275 but nevertheless asks for consent to search. As discussed 
above, if the officer’s beliefs that she has alternative grounds to search are 
correct, then relying on consent imposes no additional costs and arguably 
benefits perceived fairness and certainty.276 However, what if the police 
officer’s beliefs are wrong? If the only reason the police officer requested 
consent to search was because of unfounded suspicions, the 
consent-search doctrine creates a mask that conceals the underlying 
problem. Reliance on consent deprives a reviewing court of the ability to 
serve a teaching function by assessing the legitimacy of the officer’s 
suspicions. 
The role consent plays as an “easy” justification to search is a final 
cost of the doctrine that the Supreme Court has overlooked: its potential, 
if unrestrained, to swallow the remainder of the Fourth Amendment 
landscape. The Fourth Amendment’s “essential purpose” is to “shield the 
citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.”277 The presumptive 
method for determining whether an intrusion into privacy is justified is to 
require a warrant based on probable cause.278 Moreover, to control police 
discretion and avoid the dangers inherent in a “general warrant,”279 the 
warrant must describe with particularity the “place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”280 Even in the many circumstances in 
which the Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
                                                                                                                     
 272. See Barrio, supra note 137, at 247 (“[T]he authority behind the officer’s request to 
search will often indicate to suspects that they have no choice but to consent, leading them to 
authorize searches otherwise forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.”) (footnote omitted).  
 273. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6–7, 10 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 
(1983). 
 274. See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text for a discussion of why police may 
request consent even when they have an alternative justification to act. 
 275. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47–48 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 147 (1925); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592, 592–95 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
 276. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 277. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); see also New York v. Belton, 453 
U.S. 454, 464 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 278. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51.  
 279. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (“The principal evil of the general 
warrant was addressed by the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement . . . .”).  
 280. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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those exceptions are supposed to be narrowly construed.281 This principle 
“carries with it two corollaries:”282 first, a warrantless search must be 
“strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible,”283 and second, in recognizing an exception to the 
warrant requirement, the Court should “carefully consider the facts and 
circumstances of each search and seizure, focusing on the reasons 
supporting the exception.”284 Following these corollaries, the Court has 
recognized numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, each with 
its own scope, drawn to reflect the justifications underlying the exception.  
However, these supposedly important corollaries cease to exist when 
it comes to consent. Instead, police may always request consent, without 
ever having to justify the request. And once they obtain consent, the 
Court’s ongoing enterprise of trying to restrain police discretion to search 
becomes irrelevant.285 Because nearly everyone consents, the police can 
almost always bypass not only the default warrant requirement, but also 
its carefully delineated exceptions.286 Moreover, because there need be 
no justification for a consent search beyond the granting of consent, the 
scope of a consent search is potentially endless.287 Consent searches, as 
currently defined, are the exception that swallows every other Fourth 
Amendment rule. 288  This undermining of the Court’s taxonomy for 
defining the “reasonableness” of a search is yet another hidden toll the 
consent-search doctrine exacts on Fourth Amendment interests. 
V.  PUTTING REASONABLENESS BACK INTO CONSENT 
Scholars have no shortage of advice on how to improve the 
consent-search doctrine. Some have advocated eliminating the 
                                                                                                                     
 281. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 393–94 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971); Vale v. 
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). 
 282. Belton, 453 U.S. at 464 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 283. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 284. Belton, 453 U.S. at 464.  
 285. See George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison 
Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1505 (2005) 
(stating that the strategy of obtaining consent “has proved so successful that it has largely replaced 
other justifications for searching a suspect such as incident to arrest or in a Terry stop and frisk”). 
 286. See Thomas III, supra note 257, at 541 (“Consent is an acid that has eaten away the 
Fourth Amendment.”); Rebecca Strauss, Note, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: 
The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 876–77 (2002) (“The 
Court has held that when the subject of a search voluntarily gives his consent, it is reasonable for 
a police officer to conduct a search without a warrant.”).  
 287. See Strauss, supra note 286, at 876 (arguing that “[c]onsent searches come dangerously 
close to general warrants by giving the searching police officer undue discretion to determine the 
scope of the search”). 
 288. Cf. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (rejecting the government’s 
argument that a defendant who was taken to a police station was not seized because “any 
‘exception’ that could cover a seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow 
the general rule that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable 
cause”). 
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consent-search exception altogether. 289  However, given the Court’s 
fondness for the doctrine, 290  the Court is unlikely to abandon the 
consent-search exception.291 Moreover, it is difficult to argue with the 
underlying rationale for the doctrine in a (perhaps rare) situation where 
the searched individual truly wants to be searched.292 The challenge, 
however, is to reshape the doctrine to mirror the “reasonableness” that is 
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment. 
A.  A Role for Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 
Part IV drew on a macro concept of reasonableness and argued that, as 
currently implemented, the consent-search exception extracts high costs 
to individual privacy without corresponding benefits to law enforcement. 
Most scholars who have advocated reforms to the doctrine have focused 
on reducing the level of the intrusion on individual privacy by attempting 
to ensure that the search is truly voluntary.293 For example, scholars have 
advocated that police use written consent forms,294  that requests for 
consent be videotaped,295 or that magistrates be used to ensure that a 
person’s consent is voluntary.296  Most commonly, scholars have argued 
that police should be required to warn people they have a right to refuse 
                                                                                                                     
 289. E.g., Strauss, supra note 1, at 258–72 (setting forth the “radical solution” of 
“eliminating consent”); Lassiter, supra note 7, at 82 (proposing elimination of the fiction that 
motorists ever voluntarily consent to searches during traffic stops); Thomas III, supra note 257, at 
551–52 (discussing the benefits of “abolishing consent searches” vis-à-vis racial profiling); see 
Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1618 (noting that “one solution would be banning consent 
searches altogether, though it is not necessary to go that far”).  
 290. See supra Section IV.A.  
 291. Maclin, supra note 109, at 78–79 (noting the current Supreme Court “will never ban 
consent searches”); see Strauss, supra note 1, at 271 (characterizing elimination of consent 
searches as a “drastic solution”). 
 292. For example, one could imagine a person volunteering for DNA testing that would 
exonerate him when he knows his community suspects him of wrongdoing. 
 293. Burkoff, supra note 7, at 1139–41 (proposing a standard requiring awareness of the 
right to refuse consent as a predicate to voluntariness); Maclin, supra note 109, at 79–80 
(proposing a prophylactic rule that would better ensure the voluntariness of consent searches by 
barring the police from further seeking consent once the subject has already refused); Rotenberg, 
supra note 11, at 179–80; see also Nadler, supra note 9, at 214, 221–22 (criticizing the Court’s 
consent-search standards as a “sham” that “struggles against a wealth of social science evidence, 
that subjects many innocent people to suspicionless searches and seizures against their will”).  
 294. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial 
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 364 (2001) (“All 
consent requests should be recorded, and all consents should be in writing and signed by the 
driver, passenger, or pedestrian who was stopped.”). But see Nancy Leong & Kira Suyeishi, 
Consent Forms and Consent Formalism, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 751, 778–83, 790 (providing that 
although consent forms provide an essentially dispositive effect on the determination of consent 
voluntariness, “in reality [consent forms] are no better a guarantee of voluntariness than oral 
warnings”). 
 295. Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 294, at 792–93. 
 296. Bar-Gill & Friedman, supra note 5, at 1663. 
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consent.297 However, warnings are unlikely to be a panacea. As an initial 
matter, they simultaneously say too little and too much. A warning that 
the individual has a right to refuse does not make clear, for example, that 
his refusal to cooperate cannot be used against him, that he has the right to 
limit the scope of the search, and that he can revoke consent at any time. 
The warning may also not be true if the police are seeking consent as a 
redundant justification to another exception to the warrant requirement, 
such as a search incident to arrest or a Terry frisk.298 Moreover, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that, just as most people waive their Miranda 
rights, consent-search warnings have very little effect, most likely 
because of the inherent social authority that comes with police 
interactions. 299  If anything, consent-search warnings are likely to 
increase the number of searches upheld under the doctrine, because 
courts are likely to view the warnings as dispositive evidence that the 
resulting search was voluntary.300 
Without detracting from efforts to narrow the consent doctrine to 
include only those searches that are truly consensual, this Article’s 
emphasis on the traditional Fourth Amendment view of reasonableness 
suggests an alternative method of improving the balance between 
governmental and individual interests. Other scholars have also looked to 
the Fourth Amendment’s touchstone of reasonableness to shape Fourth 
Amendment doctrine generally. For example, Professor Christopher 
Slobogin, has offered a “reconceptualization” of reasonableness using a 
principle of proportionality: “A search or seizure is reasonable if the 
strength of its justification is roughly proportionate to the level of 
intrusion associated with the police action.”301 Professor Cynthia Lee has 
proposed a multi-step process of “reasonableness with teeth,” under 
which courts would review the reasonableness of warrantless searches by 
                                                                                                                     
 297. E.g., Gallini, supra note 2, at 236–37 (advocating reversal of Schneckloth to require 
police to warn people they have a right to refuse consent); Chanenson, supra note 13, at 464 & 
n.398, 465–66 (arguing that, despite the potential utility of warnings to be “oversold,” warnings 
nevertheless cannot hurt); Hemmens & Maahs, supra note 13, at 346 (arguing that officers should 
be required to advise citizens of their right to not cooperate); Lassiter, supra note 13, at 1182–94 
(encouraging states to use their own constitutions to implement several consent-search reforms, 
including warnings about the right to refuse consent); Whorf, supra note 13, at 410 (suggesting a 
rule that people be told they are free to leave before police ask for consent to search). 
 298. For a discussion of the use of consent as a redundant justification, see supra 
Subsections IV.B.2, IV.B.4. 
 299. Lichtenberg, supra note 5, at 360–61, 363–65, 367 (discussing the relationship between 
police authority and subjects of consent searches and finding that over 88% of drivers gave 
consent to search when asked before im plementation of a Robinette warning and approximately 
92.2% gave consent after the warning). 
 300. See Leong & Suyeishi, supra note 294, at 778–83, 790 (criticizing the “essentially 
dispositive effect” that courts place on written consent forms in determining the voluntariness of 
consent, because written consent can still be coerced).  
 301. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 21 (2007); see also Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call 
for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1054 (1998); 
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). 
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assessing the nature of the intrusion into privacy, whether the police had 
probable cause, the practicability of a warrant, and whether the police 
acted in bad faith.302  
However, unlike the scholars discussed above, the Court has lost this 
focus on reasonableness from a Fourth Amendment perspective in the 
consent-search context because of its emphasis on the coercion/volition 
dichotomy.303 To return real reasonableness to consent searches, courts 
should consider the reasonableness of a consent search in light of Fourth 
Amendment values, rather than only by the supposed voluntariness of the 
consent. Despite the Court’s focus on volition, current doctrine leaves 
room for a requirement that individual consent searches must also be 
reasonable in light of a balance between the individual and governmental 
interests at stake.  
As an initial matter, all searches must be executed reasonably. The 
reasonableness requirement, “[i]n each case[,] . . . requires a balancing of 
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights 
that the search entails.”304 Accordingly, even searches that are authorized 
in theory can become unlawful if they are not reasonable at a micro level. 
For example, searches conducted pursuant to a warrant based on probable 
cause carry the hallmark of reasonableness; nevertheless, the search 
would be unlawful if police searched an area too small to contain the 
object of the search, or if the police failed to knock and announce their 
presence prior to searching.305 Similarly, the Court has announced a 
bright-line rule that it is always reasonable to detain people who are on 
the premises when a search warrant is executed,306 but the reasonableness 
of using handcuffs to achieve the detention must be litigated on a micro, 
case-by-case basis.307 The standard used for determining the lawfulness 
of strip searches is further evidence of a prevailing requirement of micro- 
level reasonableness. In addition to a general justification to search, strip 
searches must also be reasonable under the circumstances.308  
Though the Court has discussed reasonableness in the consent-search 
context primarily through the consent/volition dichotomy,309 remnants of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness are discernable. For example, even if 
the officer obtains consent that is deemed voluntary, the search is 
nevertheless unlawful if the officer goes beyond the scope to which a 
reasonable person would have believed she consented. 310  Especially 
                                                                                                                     
 302. Lee, supra note 197, at 1137, 1144, 1181. 
 303. See supra Part III.  
 304. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added).  
 305. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).  
 306. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 704–05 (1981) (holding that the extent of 
force used to detain persons on premises must be made on a case-by-case basis).  
 307. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 111 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 308. Bell, 441 U.S. at 558–59; Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 
2642 (2009).  
 309. See supra Part III. 
 310. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991); see also Tim Sobczak, Note, The 
Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutionality of Passing Consent from an Informant 
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illustrative of Fourth Amendment reasonableness’s vitality in the consent 
doctrine is the Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph.311 In Randolph, 
a wife called the police about a domestic disturbance and then told the 
responding officers that her husband, Randolph, used cocaine. 312 
Randolph denied his wife’s accusation and claimed she was the one with 
a substance abuse problem.313 His wife then volunteered that there was 
evidence of her husband’s drug use in their house.314 After Randolph, a 
lawyer, “unequivocally refused” a request for consent to search, his wife 
“readily” provided it.315  
Existing doctrine suggested that the resulting search was lawful. 
After all, the Court had already held that searches were reasonable if 
based on the voluntary consent of a co-occupant.316 Indeed, relying on a 
“reasonableness” model, the Court had extended the consent search 
rationale even to those cases in which the party granting consent did not 
actually share common authority over the premises, but merely appeared 
to.317 Nevertheless, five Justices held in Randolph that the police acted 
unreasonably by searching Randolph’s home with only his wife’s 
consent.318 The Court distinguished earlier third-party consent cases as 
involving non-consenting parties who were either not present when the 
third party consented,319 or were present but had not expressly declined to 
give consent.320 Looking to “widely shared social expectations,”321 the 
majority reasoned that people who choose to live with others assume the 
risk that their co-occupants will invite others in, but not while one 
occupant is physically present and expressly objecting to the entry: 
[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared 
premises would have no confidence that one occupant’s 
invitation was a sufficiently good reason to enter when a 
fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.” Without some 
very good reason, no sensible person would go inside under 
those conditions.322 
                                                                                                                     
to Law Enforcement, 62 FLA. L. REV. 493, 502 & n.72 (2010) (“The Court in Florida v. Jimeno 
held that the scope of consent is determined through a standard of objective reasonableness, that 
is, what a reasonable person would believe the limits of the consent were.”).  
 311. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 312. Id. at 107.  
 313. Id.  
 314. Id.  
 315. Id.  
 316. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
 317. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). 
 318. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23 (“[A] physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of 
consent to police search is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”). 
 319. Id. at 106, 121 (referencing Matlock, which involved the defendant detained in a nearby 
squad car). 
 320. Id. at 106, 121 (noting that in Rodriguez, the defendant was sleeping inside when police 
relied on apparent authority of another party to search his home). 
 321. Id. at 111. 
 322. Id. at 113. 
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It is for good reason that Professor Maclin has declared the Court’s 
decision in Randolph “good news” for consent-search jurisprudence.323 
The decision examined the defendant’s social expectations not only 
vis-à-vis his co-occupant/wife, but also with respect to the police who 
were asking to search. It was not only reasonable for Randolph to expect 
his wife not to invite someone in after he had objected; it was also 
reasonable for him to expect the police not to rely on her consent, even if 
she gave it.324 Reading Randolph more broadly, one could view the Court 
as scrutinizing not only the voluntariness of the consent (which 
Randolph’s wife’s consent surely was), but also the reasonableness of the 
government’s request in asking for it. Would a reasonable person, having 
been rejected entry by one member of a household, attempt a second bite 
at the apple with another, while the objecting party was still present? 
Apparently she would not.325 
B.  A Glimpse at Reasonable Requests for Consent 
Though the Court in Schneckloth stated that consent searches served a 
“legitimate need,”326 this Article demonstrated in Part IV that the Court’s 
conclusion was based only on a macro assessment of reasonableness, and 
a wholly incomplete one at that. To inject Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness into the consent doctrine, courts assessing the 
reasonableness of an individual consent search at a micro level should 
consider not only any coercive tactics used to extract consent, but also the 
reasonableness of the request for consent to search itself. Determining the 
reasonableness of the request would involve judicial scrutiny of both the 
government’s reason for asking for consent and the scope of the consent 
requested. 
As the Court has recognized in myriad other contexts, “[t]he test of 
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise 
definition or mechanical application.” 327  Generally, to balance the 
government’s needs against individual privacy rights, courts should 
“consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is 
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
                                                                                                                     
 323. See Maclin, supra note 109, at 67. Providing a thoughtful and thorough analysis of 
Randolph and its precedents, Professor Maclin found the Court’s emphasis on Randolph’s 
express refusal to consent especially important. Id. at 78 (connecting the emphasis on Randolph’s 
refusal to give consent specifically to Justice Kennedy’s tie-breaking vote). Building on this 
emphasis, Professor Maclin advocates for a per se rule against requesting consent after an 
individual declines a first request. Id. at 80. 
 324. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 113. 
 325. In Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014), the Court refused to extend the 
holding of Randolph to a case in which the defendant objected to a search, was then taken into 
custody, and therefore was no longer present to object when his co-occupant consented. Id. at 
1129–31. Though the Court found that the police acted reasonably in Fernandez, and 
unreasonably in Randolph, both cases evince a willingness to scrutinize the circumstances 
surrounding a request for consent to search in determining the search’s reasonableness.   
 326. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 327. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
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conducted.” 328  Applying these factors to consent searches, a court 
assessing the reasonableness of a request for consent to search should 
consider both the reason for the request and the requested scope. 
1.  The Reason for the Request 
Many of the more troubling consequences of current consent doctrine 
can be attributed to the fact that police do not have to articulate any reason 
at all for requesting consent to search.329 As long as there is no limit to the 
ability of police to ask for consent, there is no limit to the overall number 
of consent searches police can seek. As a matter of privacy, the odds that 
these searches will affect wholly innocent people are highest when police 
lack any basis to suspect that evidence will be found in the search. As a 
matter of equality, without a requirement that police articulate a reason 
for requesting consent, it is impossible to know whether they are relying 
on impermissible factors such as race. These costs in the Fourth 
Amendment balance would be reduced if police were required to 
articulate a legitimate reason, beyond mere curiosity, for the request. 
Importantly, under the proposal presented in this Article, the 
government’s reason for requesting consent would not have to be 
sufficient to justify a search in the absence of consent. Clearly, if the 
police already had a basis for searching (e.g., a search incident to arrest or 
probable cause to search an automobile), those justifications would be 
sufficient to search, and would render a (redundant) request for consent to 
search reasonable, as long as the scope of the search was also reasonable. 
This Article simply proposes that the request for consent be reasonable, 
and that courts could look to other Fourth Amendment contexts for 
guidance regarding the reasonableness of the request. 
For example, usually the standard of suspicion required for a search 
for evidence is probable cause; the lesser showing of reasonable 
suspicion justifies only an investigative stop and accompanying frisk for 
weapons. 330  Nevertheless, even some critics of the consent-search 
exception to the warrant requirement agree that it is reasonable for police 
to request consent when they have a reasonable suspicion that they will 
find something. 331  Though the level of suspicion alone would be 
insufficient to obtain a warrant, the government would at least have some 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
 329. See Steinbock, supra note 248, at 536; United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 
(2002) (“Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, 
they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  
 330. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366, 372–73, 375 (1993). 
 331. See Lassiter, supra note 13, at 1191–92 (citing cases that recommend a requirement of 
reasonable suspicion to support consent searches).  
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level of individual suspicion—an important component of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness.332  
Another example of a reasonable request for consent to search is 
where the purpose of the search is to protect public safety. Take Florida 
v. J.L.333 as an example in which concerns about public safety, though 
themselves insufficient to justify a warrantless search, would render a 
request for consent reasonable. In J.L., police received an anonymous 
phone call claiming that a young black man wearing a plaid shirt at a 
specific bus stop was carrying a gun.334 When police arrived at the bus 
stop, they saw J.L., who was wearing a plaid shirt.335 Based only on that 
information, police stopped and frisked J.L.336 The Court held that the tip, 
standing alone, was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, 
because it was wholly anonymous, with no indication of the source’s 
basis of knowledge or veracity. 337 Alternatively, the government urged 
the Court to recognize a “firearm exception” to the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion, permitting police to stop and frisk based on any tip 
alleging unlawful gun possession.338 The Court declined to create such an 
exception.339 Though it was not reasonable to search J.L. solely on the 
basis of the anonymous tip, such a tip could be offered as a reasonable 
basis for requesting consent to search. 340 
Another situation in which requests for consent to search are 
reasonable is where the discretion of individual officers is otherwise 
limited. A central goal of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent the 
government from exercising “standardless and unconstrained discretion” 
in picking and choosing whom to seize and search. 341  Though 
individualized suspicion is the usual rule that limits police discretion,342 
the Court has recognized alternative methods as adequate. 343  For 
                                                                                                                     
 332. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 41 (2000) (characterizing 
individual suspicion as an important predicate to most searches permitted by the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 333. 529 U.S. 266 (2000). 
 334. Id. at 268. 
 335. Id.  
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 271, 274. 
 338. Id. at 272. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Professor George Thomas, who would prefer to eliminate the consent search exception 
to the warrant requirement, would permit consent searches that advance the government’s interest 
in public safety. See Thomas III, supra note 257, at 557. 
 341. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979). 
 342. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (describing individualized 
suspicion as a constraint on police discretion); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 
(2000) (referring to “the general rule that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of 
individualized suspicion”). 
 343. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654–55 (noting that in “situations in which the balance of 
interests precludes insistence upon some quantum of individualized suspicion”—such as 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion—“other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure 
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example, police might drug test every employee involved in an 
accident344 or stop every fifth car that passes through a DUI roadblock.345 
Typically, the Court has limited searches without suspicion to activity 
advancing a government interest that is qualitatively distinguishable from 
ordinary law enforcement.346 Here again, however, the limit on discretion 
is not being used as a justification to search, but simply as a factor in 
determining the reasonableness of the government’s request to search.  
Requiring police to articulate their reasons for requesting consent to 
search would reduce some of the larger costs of these searches to Fourth 
Amendment interests. First, it is likely to reduce the number of requests 
that are motivated by racial or other prohibited factors. Current doctrine 
does not provide a basis for uncovering the role that discrimination may 
play in so-called “consent” searches, because the entire focus is on the 
voluntariness of the consent, with no scrutiny of the request itself. If 
police know they will be required to articulate a reason for requesting 
consent—whether it be some basis for suspicion, some concern for public 
safety, or pursuant to some systemized approach that limits officer 
discretion—they may avoid engaging in race-based consent searches. In 
this respect, a court’s insistence upon a reason for requesting consent 
resembles the ability of litigants to force lawyers to articulate a reason for 
exercising a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror.347 The 
reason itself need not rise to the level necessary to strike a juror for 
cause,348 but the process of requiring the lawyer to state a race-neutral 
reason is intended to serve as a method of both deterring discrimination 
and detecting it where it exists.  
Second, consideration of the officer’s reason for requesting consent 
will return at least some role of education to the subsequent motion to 
suppress. Currently, consent serves as a “mask” for other potential 
justifications for the search. For example, the police may believe they 
                                                                                                                     
that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the 
official in the field” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 344. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989). 
 345. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451, 455 (1990). 
 346. For example, the Court has upheld administrative searches in the absence of suspicion, 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511–12 (1978); 
“special needs” searches, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666, 675 (1989); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20; 
inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–76 (1976) (upholding the 
reasonableness of administrative searches in light of the “distinct needs” served by such searches); 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 375–76 (1987); community caretaking searches, Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447–48 (1973); and roadblocks that advance a primary purpose that 
is connected to highway safety, Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 561–62 (1976). 
 347. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that peremptory challenges 
based on racial discrimination violate the Fourteenth Amendment and creating a three-step 
process for determining whether a peremptory challenge is based on prohibited discrimination). 
 348. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768–69 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that what is 
required is a clear and reasonably specific explanation of the legitimate reasons for using the 
peremptory challenges). 
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have probable cause to search an automobile349 or reasonable suspicion to 
support a stop and frisk. 350 If they seek and obtain consent, the motion to 
suppress can be resolved on these grounds, without the court ever having 
to address—and without the officer ever learning—whether the other 
grounds were legitimate. If police were required to articulate their reasons 
for requesting consent—and if these reasons were actually sufficient 
grounds to search, standing alone—a court would likely rely on these 
grounds to uphold the search because the voluntariness of the search 
would then be irrelevant. Even if the reasons, standing alone, were not 
sufficient to search, the police officer would at least learn whether the 
reasons were sufficient to justify a request to search, and this may 
improve the officer’s conduct in the future.  
At the same time, courts would learn more about the real-life 
dynamics of consent searches. Once police have to articulate their reasons 
for requesting consent, courts may recognize that at least some of these 
requests are based on race or other discriminatory factors. They will also 
learn that police often ask for consent even when they intend to conduct 
the search regardless of whether they obtain consent. If courts realize that 
sometimes police search even after an individual declines consent, that 
information might inform subsequent judicial decisions about the real 
“voluntariness” of consent. 
2.  The Reasonableness of the Scope 
The reasonableness of a request for consent to search should take into 
account not only the officer’s reasons for asking for consent, but also the 
scope of the consent that she requests. For example, a police officer with 
reason to believe someone is carrying contraband could reasonably 
request consent to search for drugs. An officer searching to protect public 
safety could reasonably request consent to search for weapons. A 
department concerned about drug transportation on its highways could 
request consent to search from each, or every fifth, motorist stopped 
lawfully for a traffic infraction. 
Consider, in contrast, a tactic one police officer asked this author, at 
the time a prosecutor, about many years ago: If neighbors believed a 
house was being used to sell or manufacture drugs, a standard police 
response was to visit the house for a “knock and talk.”351 This officer, 
however, had added his own gloss to the practice, and wanted to make 
sure it was permissible. If the suspect had a prior drug record that might 
indicate he was too savvy to consent to search, the officer, instead of 
asking for consent to search for drugs, would ask for consent to search for 
                                                                                                                     
 349. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149 (1925). 
 350. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10–11, 27 (1968); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1049 (1983). 
 351. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1423 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (using the 
term “knock and talk” to refer to the practice of “knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an 
occupant for the purpose of gathering evidence”). 
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“any jewelry that shouldn’t be in the house.” He described the practice as 
remarkably effective and even suggested a reason why: The suspect was 
so relieved to be asked about something he did not do that his immediate 
instinct was to cooperate; once he consented, he would fear that any 
backpedaling would be seen as suspicious.352 And it was not coincidental 
that the officer used jewelry as the stated object of the search; because 
jewelry is small, the scope of the resulting search would be sufficiently 
intrusive to turn up any drugs that might be on the premises.353  
What the officer wanted to know was whether this practice was 
lawful. Was it? The Supreme Court has made clear that, in general, the 
Constitution does not prohibit police officers from using deception.354 
Though the Court has not specifically addressed the use of deception by 
police officers requesting consent to search, lower courts permit deceit as 
long as it does not render the consent involuntary under the totality of the 
circumstances.355 Indeed, police officers are even instructed that there is 
no per se prohibition against using trickery to obtain consent.356 If the 
only consideration is the voluntariness of the consent, the “ask for 
                                                                                                                     
 352. See supra notes 113–14 for a general discussion of the fear that refusal to cooperate will 
be seen as suspicious. 
 353. To be clear, as long as the consent search for jewelry was valid, any drugs found could 
be lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine, even though their discovery was far from 
accidental. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 135–36, 140 (1990) (removing 
inadvertence as a necessary condition of a valid plain view seizure and further providing that a 
plain view seizure is justified where: (1) “the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in 
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed”; (2) the item’s 
“incriminating character [is] ‘immediately apparent’”; and (3) the officer has “a lawful right of 
access to the object”). 
 354. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies 
by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 778–88 (1997) (noting the considerable leeway afforded by the 
Court to the police in the undercover context and further noting the pervasive use of lying and 
deceit by officers in the search and seizure context); Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing 
Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979) (detailing and analyzing the prevalence of trickery or 
deceit in police practices in the absence of clear constitutional standards and in the absence of 
“definitive guidance from the Supreme Court,” especially considering the Court’s voluntariness 
doctrine).  
 355. See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. 
REV, 425, 429–32 & nn.15–44 (1996) (cataloguing lower court cases upholding deceptive police 
tactics and the confessions therefrom, despite the fact that the police lied about the strength of 
their case, fabricated evidence, lied about the extent of the suspect’s culpability, and lied about 
circumstances of the interrogation).  
 356. See id. at 427–28 & n.10 (“[P]olice interrogation manuals and police seminars 
recommend police lying, virtually ensuring that each new police officer is familiar with the 
technique.” (footnotes omitted)); ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 264, at 
24–25 (setting forth, in a prosecution memo, “consensual entry by trick” tactics, such as 
misrepresenting the officer’s identity and employing false friends, which tactics will likely “not 
invalidate an entry or search because . . . a suspect’s consent need not be ‘knowing and 
intelligent’”); Frank Connelly, Consent to Enter or Search by Deception, FED. LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CTR., 1–3, available at https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/impo 
rted_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amend
ment/ConsenttoEnterorSearchbyDeception.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (training manual 
regarding the use of deception to obtain consent to search). 
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jewelry” practice would appear viable in the absence of any coercion used 
to overcome the person’s ability to refuse. Nevertheless, at the time, this 
author warned the officer that a court offended by his conduct might look 
to the overarching Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness to 
declare the search unlawful. 
Again, Randolph proves a helpful comparison. The wife’s consent 
was voluntary; the problem was that it was unreasonable to ask her for it 
or rely on it. Just as social norms suggest that “no sensible person” would 
walk into a home while one of its co-occupants was present and telling 
her to stay out,357 no sensible person would walk into someone’s home 
when the invitation was based on the visitor’s lie about her reasons for 
entering. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the role that “reasonableness” has played in the consent-search 
exception to the warrant requirement, the Court has focused on 
reasonableness through the lens of a coercion/volition dichotomy 
borrowed from Fifth Amendment doctrine governing the voluntariness of 
confessions. The traditional notion of Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness—requiring a balancing of government and individual 
interests—has been lost in the noise. This Article has attempted to return 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness to the consent doctrine in two ways. 
First, this Article assessed the reasonableness of consent searches at a 
macro level, examining the governmental interests served by consent 
searches and the impact on individual privacy. This analysis revealed that 
the Court, to the extent it has undertaken a macro examination of 
reasonableness at all, has overstated the extent that consent searches 
advance governmental interests and understated their toll on individual 
privacy. Second, to make consensual searches more reasonable at the 
macro level, this Article has argued that courts should assess not only the 
voluntariness of the consent to search, but also the reasonableness of the 
request to consent itself. This micro-level examination of reasonableness 
will allow courts to determine whether the resulting search does in fact 
bear a reasonable relationship to the government’s need for engaging in 
it. 
Aligning consent-search doctrine with traditional conceptions of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness would drastically change the way that 
law enforcement views and is trained regarding consent searches. 
Currently, consent is seen as a “free-for-all,” in which it “never hurts to 
ask.”358 Police can request consent to search anything, and the resulting 
search will be reasonable as long as the consent appears to be voluntary. 
If, instead, police officers know they will have to articulate their reasons 
for asking for consent and the logic behind the scope of the search, then 
                                                                                                                     
 357. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006). 
 358. See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text. 
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the resulting searches are more likely to be truly reasonable, at both the 
micro and macro levels.  
One disadvantage of “reasonableness” assessments generally is their 
inherently inexact nature. In many contexts, the Court has opted for 
bright-line criminal procedural rules because of their clarity and 
predictability.359 While bright-line rules bring clarity and predictability, 
standards like “reasonableness” are indeterminate and require 
case-by-case decision-making.360 When it comes to consent searches, the 
Court has repeatedly “eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing 
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”361 This Article’s 
proposal, accordingly, does little to shift the position of consent-search 
doctrine along the rules–standards spectrum. The Court is already using a 
flexible, fact-intensive standard; this Article simply calls on the Court to 
apply the correct one: a standard of Fourth—not Fifth—Amendment 
reasonableness. 
                                                                                                                     
 359. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: 
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 365 (2004) 
(“[T]he need for bright-line rules was married to the reasonableness model of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the Burger Court had found its paradigm for searches and seizures.”); Craig M. 
Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1479 (1985); Wayne R. 
LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson 
Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141–42; Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 34, 39 (2009).  
 360. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
594, 596 (1992); John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 996 
(2014) (“A legal rule has the advantage of clarity and comprehensibility over a standard, other 
things being equal.”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–89 (1976) (describing the value of rules that are “formally realizable,” 
as distinguished from a “standard,” which occupies the “opposite pole” and typically requires an 
ex post fact-specific inquiry); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (noting that a standard “tends to collapse 
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact 
situation,” while a rule “binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of 
delimited triggering facts”). 
 361. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (reversing lower court for using a bright-line 
rule to determine the voluntariness of consent when the person granting it had been stopped by 
police). 
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